

Conference on Disarmament

17 August 2018

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
Note verbale dated 3 August 2018 from the Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to the United Nations Office, the World Trade Organization and other International Organizations at Geneva addressed to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament, and in its capacity as the Coordinator for the Group of 21

The Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to the United Nations Office, the World Trade Organization and other International Organizations has the honour to submit herewith the G-21 Working paper on Nuclear Disarmament.

On behalf of the Group of 21, the Permanent Mission of Viet Nam requests that the document be issued as an official Working paper of the Conference on Disarmament for the year 2018.

The permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to the United Nations Office, the World Trade Organization and other International Organizations at Geneva avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament the assurance of its highest consideration.

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Nuclear disarmament

1. The Group of 21 reiterates that the Conference of Disarmament is the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, and in that context, the Group stresses that its highest priority on the Conference of Disarmament agenda is nuclear disarmament.
2. The Group reiterates its deep concern at the danger posed to the survival of humankind by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and of their possible use or threat of use. As long as nuclear weapons exist, the risk of their use and proliferation will remain.
3. The Group reiterates its position as conveyed in its previous statements to the Conference of Disarmament and recalls the Final Documents of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly -the First Special Session on Disarmament and the very first resolution of the United Nations General Assembly 1(1) of 1946, adopted unanimously, which called for the elimination of nuclear weapons from national arsenals.
4. The Non-Aligned Movement Countries members of the Group recall the 2012 Tehran Summit Declaration and the Final Document of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Declaration and the Final Document of the XVII Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Movement held in Margarita Island, Venezuela on September 2016, as well as the Final Document of the 18th Mid-Term Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Baku, Republic of Azerbaijan on April 2018.
5. Furthermore, the International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion of 1996, concluded that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. In this regard, the Group recalls its strong support for the United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/72/58 entitled, "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons".
6. The Millennium Declaration in 2000 also reaffirmed the commitment of Member States of the United Nations to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons.
7. The Group welcomes the formal proclamation, for the first time in history, of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace, on the occasion of the Second Summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), held in Havana, Cuba, on 28-29 January 2014, which includes the commitment of all States of that region to further nuclear disarmament as a priority goal and to contribute to general and complete disarmament. Hopefully, this proclamation will be followed by other political proclamations as "Zones of Peace" in other regions of the world. The Group welcomes the Political Declaration of Quito, adopted at the Fourth Summit of Latin American and Caribbean States held in Quito, Ecuador, on 27 January 2016, which reaffirms, inter alia, the commitment of CELAC to the preservation of peace and international security, political independence and nuclear disarmament conducive to general, total and verifiable disarmament. The Group also welcomes the Political Declaration of Punta Cana, adopted at the Fifth Summit of Latin American and Caribbean States held in Punta Cana, Dominican Republic, on 25 January 2017, which reaffirms, inter alia, the commitment of CELAC achieve a total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. CELAC reaffirms its commitment to the consolidation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace and highlights its character of first ever Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The Group welcomes the celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco on 14 February 2017 in Mexico, in the framework of the 25th Session

of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL).

8. The group also welcomes the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty, known as the Treaty of Pelindaba, signed in Cairo, Egypt, in 1996. The Treaty, which came into effect on 15th July, 2009, seeks to prevent the stationing of nuclear explosives devices, prohibit the testing of nuclear weapons, and the dumping of radioactive waste on the continent. For the purpose of ensuring compliance with the obligations under the treaty, the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) was established.

9. The Group, while noting the steps taken by nuclear-weapon States (NWS) for the reduction of their arsenals, reiterates its deep concern over the slow pace of progress towards nuclear disarmament and the lack of progress by the NWS towards accomplishing the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. The Group stresses the importance of effective implementation of concrete measures leading to a nuclear weapons free world. This requires renewed political will by the international community towards accelerated progress on nuclear disarmament. The Group hope that all States would seize all opportunities towards this end.

10. The Group welcomes the convening and results of the high level meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament on 26 September 2013 and reaffirms its related resolution A/RES/70/34 and A/RES/72/251 to follow up to this meeting. As the former Secretary General of the United Nations rightly mentioned in the Conference of Disarmament in 2015 "The High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament demonstrated that this issue remains a major international priority and deserves attention at the highest levels". In this vein, the Group fully supports the goals of this resolution, in particular its call for urgent decision by the Conference of Disarmament to commence negotiating nuclear disarmament, particularly a comprehensive Convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction. The Group also welcomes the decision to convene, in New York no later than 2018, a UN high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in this regard. The Group welcomes with appreciation the establishment of September 26 as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, and the high-level plenary meeting of the General Assembly organized every year to commemorate and promote this International Day, highlighting the events around the world in commemoration of this day, and calls on governments, parliaments and civil society to take further action annually to commemorate the day. In this context, the Group recalls its working paper contained in CD/2063 and CD/2067.

11. The Group reaffirms the importance of the multilateral disarmament machinery. It notes the report of the Open-Ended Working Group mandated by the United Nations General Assembly "to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons" and hopes that it would contribute towards negotiations on nuclear disarmament in the Conference of Disarmament, particularly a comprehensive Convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction.

12. The Group takes note of the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on July 7th 2017 at the United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, pursuant to UNGA resolution 71/258 held in New York from 27 to 31 March and 15 June to 7 July 2017.

13. The Group expresses its deepest concern over the immediate, indiscriminate, and massive death and destruction caused by any nuclear weapon detonation and its long term catastrophic consequences on human health, environment, and other vital economic resources, thus endangering the life of present and future generations. In this regard, the Group believes that the full realization of the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons must underpin all approaches, efforts and international commitments towards nuclear disarmament, through an inclusive process involving all States.

14. The Group concurs with the former United Nations Secretary General that there is growing understanding of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, and in this regard welcomes the hosting of the Conferences on this subject, convened in Oslo on 4-5 March 2013, in Mexico on 13-14 February 2014 and in Vienna on 8-9 December 2014.

15. The States Parties of the Group of 21 to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) welcome the spirit of the findings of the Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, together with the pledges and national statements made by many states during and since the Vienna Conference aimed at securing progress on nuclear disarmament through the negotiation of legally binding effective measures, particularly a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, with a specified framework of time. The States Parties of the Group of 21 to the NPT call on all nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT to implement their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all states parties are committed to under Article VI. Given the catastrophic humanitarian consequences and unacceptable risks and threats associated with a nuclear weapon' detonation, the States Parties of the Group of 21 to the NPT will endeavour to cooperate with all relevant stakeholders in efforts to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group notes the relevant resolutions adopted by the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

16. The Group, stressing its strong commitment to nuclear disarmament, underscores the urgent need to commence negotiations on this issue, in the Conference of Disarmament, without delay. In this context, the Group reaffirms its full readiness to start negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, including a nuclear-weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, leading to the global, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons, with a specified framework of time.

17. In this regard, the Group emphasizes that fundamental principles of transparency, verification and irreversibility shall be applied to all nuclear disarmament measures.

18. The Group reaffirms that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are substantively interrelated and mutually reinforcing.

19. The G-21 emphasizes that progress in nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, in all its aspects, is essential to strengthening international peace and security. The Group reaffirms that efforts towards nuclear disarmament, global and regional approaches and confidence building measures complement each other and should, wherever possible, be pursued simultaneously to promote regional and international peace and security.

20. The Group reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of the complete elimination of such weapons, the Group reaffirms the urgent need for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument to effectively assure non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as a matter of high priority. The Group expresses concern that despite the

commitment of the nuclear weapon States (NWS) and long standing requests by NNWS to receive such legally binding assurances, no tangible progress has been achieved in this regard. It is a matter of more concern that NNWS implicitly or explicitly have been subject to nuclear threats by some nuclear weapon States contrary to their obligations under the UN Charter. The Group also calls for the commencement of negotiations in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances in accordance with UNGA resolution A/RES/72/59.

21. The Group expresses its concerns about strategic defence doctrines of NWS and a group of States which set out rationales for the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and in this regard, there is therefore a genuine and urgent need to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in strategic doctrines and security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used again and to facilitate the process of their elimination. In this regard, the Group recalls its strong support of the objectives of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 72/41 of 4 December 2017 "Reducing Nuclear Danger", as well as the United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/71/53 on "Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons Systems".

22. The G-21 stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the CTBT, including by all NWS, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Group reiterates that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the NWS, to nuclear disarmament would be essential.

23. The Group reaffirms the absolute validity of multilateral diplomacy in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, and expresses its determination to promote multilateralism as the core principle of negotiations in these areas. In this regard, the Group strongly supports the objectives of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/72/48 of 4 December 2017 on the "Promotion of Multilateralism in the Area of Disarmament and Non-proliferation".

24. The States Parties of the Group of 21 to the NPT express their disappointment and deep concern that three States Parties, including two States that bear special responsibility as NPT depositary and co-sponsors States of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference Resolution on the Middle East, blocked consensus on the draft outcome document of the ninth NPT Review Conference (NPT RevCon) including the process to establish a Middle East Zone free of Nuclear Weapons and all other Weapons of Mass Destruction, as contained in the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. This could undermine efforts towards strengthening the NPT regime as a whole. The States Parties of the Group of 21 to the NPT reaffirm that the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East continues to constitute the basis for the establishment of such a zone and that the 1995 Resolution remains valid until fully implemented. The States Parties of the Group of 21 to the NPT also express their serious concern over the lack of implementation of the 1995 Resolution, and in accordance with Para 6 of this Resolution, 'Call upon all States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction,' and reaffirm that the co-sponsors of the Resolution must take all the necessary measures to fully implement it without further delay. The States Parties of the Group of 21 to the NPT express their utmost concern that the persistent lack of implementation of the 1995 Resolution, contrary to the decisions made at the relevant NPT Review Conferences, erodes the credibility of the NPT and disrupts the delicate balance among its three pillars, taking into account that the indefinite extension of the treaty is inextricably linked to the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. In this context, the States Parties of the Group of 21 to the NPT reaffirm the urgency of Israel's

accession to the Treaty without further delay and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. While the lack of agreement on an outcome document could undermine the NPT regime, the States Parties of the Group of 21 to the NPT emphasise the continued validity of all relevant commitments made in 1995, 2000 and 2010, particularly the unequivocal undertaking towards nuclear disarmament, and calls for their full implementation without further delay.

25. The Group also wishes to reaffirm the inalienable right of each State to develop research production and use of nuclear energy, for peaceful purposes without discrimination.

26. The Group reiterates its readiness to make constructive contributions to the work of the Conference, and in this regard wishes to recall the contents of documents CD/36/Rev.1; CD/116; CD/341; CD/819; CD/1388; CD/1462; CD/1570; CD/1571, CD/1923, CD/1938, CD/1959, CD/1999, CD/ 2044, CD/2063 and CD/2099 presented by the G-21 towards this end.

27. The Group takes note of the substantive and interactive informal discussions on nuclear disarmament held in the Conference of Disarmament from 21-23 May 2014 pursuant to the Schedule of Activities of the 2014 session contained in document CD/1978, on 11 and 18 June 2015 pursuant to the Schedule of Activities of the 2015 session contained in document CD/2021, and on 8-10 August 2017 under the Working Group on the Way Ahead established by decision CD/2090.

28. In view of the Group's strong commitment to nuclear disarmament and a world free of nuclear weapons, the G-21 reiterates the following concrete steps:

(a) Reaffirmation of the unequivocal commitment of the NWS to accomplish the complete elimination of nuclear weapons;

(b) Elimination of the role of nuclear weapons in the security doctrines;

(c) Adoption of measures by nuclear-weapon States to reduce nuclear danger, such as de-alerting of nuclear-weapons and decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear-weapons systems;

(d) Negotiation of a universal, unconditional and legally-binding instrument to assure NNWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

(e) Negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament of a Nuclear Weapons Convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, leading to the global, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time.

29. To conclude, the Group of 21 highlights with satisfaction the events that took place around the world to mark the commemoration of 26 September, as the "International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons" devoted to furthering this objective, including through enhancing public awareness and education about the threat posed to humanity by nuclear weapons and the necessity for their total elimination, in order to mobilize international efforts towards achieving this goal, and in this context calls upon Member States to participate every year at the highest possible level in the one-day high-level plenary meeting of the General Assembly to commemorate and promote this International Day and also invites Member States, the United Nations system, civil society, academia, parliamentarians, the mass media and individuals to take additional measures every year to commemorate this date.

Conference on Disarmament

17 August 2018

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Note verbale dated 17 August 2018 from the Permanent Mission of Tunisia to the United Nations Office in Geneva and other International Organizations in Switzerland addressed to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament

The Permanent Mission of Tunisia to the United Nations Office in Geneva and other International Organizations in Switzerland presents its compliments to the United Nations Office in Geneva (Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament) and has the honour to refer to the 2018 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

In this connection, the Permanent Mission of Tunisia, in its capacity as President of the Conference on Disarmament, requests that the document entitled "Draft decision" issued under the symbol CD/WP.609, be registered as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament for the session 2018.

The Permanent Mission of Tunisia to the United Nations Office in Geneva and other International Organizations in Switzerland avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the United Nations Office in Geneva (Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament) the assurances of its highest consideration.

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Draft decision

The Conference on Disarmament,

Aware that progress made in the disarmament sphere contributes to the maintenance of international peace and security,

Reaffirming its role as the single multilateral negotiating body for disarmament,

Emphasizing that, in that role, it has a responsibility to identify ways and means for moving forward with its consideration of disarmament issues,

Recalling its decisions CD/2119 and CD/2126, whereby it established five subsidiary bodies as set out in paragraph 1 of decision CD/2119,

Recalling also the applicable provisions of its rules of procedure relating to the responsibility of the President to propose a programme of work for the Conference,

Considering that dialogue among its member States is essential for moving forward in its consideration of the various items on its agenda, in particular with a view to establishing a programme of work,

Noting that in-depth, substantive discussions have taken place thus far within the various subsidiary bodies established pursuant to decision CD/2119,

Taking note of the initiative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations entitled "Agenda for Disarmament", as contained in an unofficial document,

Believing that this initiative could enrich the discussion within the Conference with a view to establishing a programme of work,

Decides

1. To establish, pursuant to rules 22 and 23 of its rules of procedure, an informal working group to discuss issues raised in the above-mentioned report of the Secretary-General that are pertinent to the mandate of the Conference;
2. That the President of the Conference shall conduct the work of the group using the format of informal discussions among member States with the participation of experts and representatives of the United Nations;
3. That the working group shall begin its work once the coordinators of the five subsidiary bodies have presented their respective reports pursuant to decision CD/2119;
4. That, pursuant to rule 35 of its rules of procedure, participation in the working group is open to all States members of the Conference on Disarmament and to those States not members of the Conference that have been invited to take part in the work of the Conference at its 2018 session;
5. That the organization of work within the working group and the follow-up thereto should be agreed by the working group itself.

Conference on Disarmament

11 September 2018

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Note Verbale dated 7 September 2018 from the Permanent Missions of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America addressed to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting the text of their joint statement concerning the Presidency of the Syrian Arab Republic of the Conference on Disarmament in view of its repeated violations of international law including the Chemical Weapons Convention and United Nations Security Council resolutions

The Permanent Missions of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations in Geneva present their compliments to the Office for Disarmament Affairs, in its capacity as the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament, and have the honour to circulate the text of their joint statement concerning the Presidency of the Syrian Arab Republic of the Conference on Disarmament in view of its repeated violations of international law including the Chemical Weapons Convention and United Nations Security Council resolutions.

The Permanent Missions of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations in Geneva request that the attached joint statement be registered and circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Permanent Missions of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations in Geneva avail themselves of this opportunity to renew to the Office for Disarmament Affairs, in its capacity as the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament, the assurances of their highest consideration.

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Joint statement of Australia, Austria (on behalf of the European Union), Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America concerning the Presidency of the Syrian Arab Republic of the Conference on Disarmament in view of its repeated violations of international law including the Chemical Weapons Convention and United Nations Security Council resolutions

1. In view of the Syrian Arab Republic's repeated violations of its non-proliferation obligations, and its overwhelming responsibility for prolonging the Syrian conflict, which has entered its eighth year of continuous and widespread violence with persistent and brutal violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, we profoundly regret that the Syrian Arab Republic assumed the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament in May-June 2018.
2. We recall that in accordance with rule 9 to the Rules of Procedure, the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament rotates among all its members in alphabetical order. We respect the rules and procedures of the Conference. In our view, however, the Syrian regime did not have the necessary legitimacy to perform this function. A country that is not complying with its non-proliferation obligations should not be in a position to preside over meetings of the world's single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum.
3. As a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament, the Syrian Arab Republic has explicitly obligated itself not to possess, develop or use chemical weapons. We strongly condemn the repeated use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Armed Forces in at least four cases, as confirmed by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)/ United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. We also condemn all the cases of chemical weapons use reported by the Commission of Inquiry.
4. The Syrian Arab Republic also remains non-compliant with its Safeguards Agreement under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). We deplore the Syrian Arab Republic's lack of commitment to resolve all outstanding issues in full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and call on the Syrian Arab Republic to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol to its NPT Safeguards Agreement without delay.
5. It was not business as usual during the Presidency of the Syrian Arab Republic. Our delegations spoke out against the Syrian Arab Republic assuming this role. A number of us also limited our participation in the Conference on Disarmament during the Presidency of the Syrian Arab Republic, and at least one of us decided not to participate after the first plenary of the Presidency.
6. We wish these concerns to be reflected in the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly.

Conference on Disarmament

11 September 2018

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
Subsidiary Body 1: Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament

Report

(Adopted at the 1470th plenary meeting on 5 September 2018)

1. In its Decision CD/2119, adopted at the 1442nd plenary meeting on 16 February 2018, the Conference on Disarmament decided to establish, in accordance with Paragraph 23 of its rules of procedure, subsidiary bodies on agenda items 1 (one) to 4 (four), and one on agenda items 5 (five), 6 (six) and 7 (seven), which could also consider emerging and other issues relevant to substantive work of the Conference.
2. The work of Subsidiary Bodies would pursue the following areas and any other areas agreed by the subsidiary bodies, in accordance with the rules of procedure: (a) to reach an understanding on the areas of commonalities in the Conference on Disarmament by taking into consideration all relevant views and proposals past, present and future; (b) deepening technical discussions and broadening areas of agreement, including through the participation, in accordance with the rules of procedure, of relevant experts; (c) consider effective measures, including legal instruments for negotiations.
3. In its Decision CD/2126, adopted at the 1455th plenary meeting on 27 March 2018, the Conference on Disarmament, decided to appoint H.E. Mr. Hasan Kleib, Ambassador of Indonesia, as the Coordinator of the Subsidiary Body 1 - Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
4. Pursuant to the annex of the same decision, the meetings of Subsidiary Body 1 took place on 25 June pm, 26 June pm, 31 July pm, 2 August am and pm, 3 August am, and 9 August pm.
5. In accordance with Paragraph 5 of the Decision CD/2119, the Conference on Disarmament also decided that the report on the progress achieved and agreed on in each subsidiary body would be submitted by its coordinator to the Conference on Disarmament, through the President, for adoption and due reflection in the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly of the United Nations. The present report is submitted pursuant to that Decision.
6. The first session of Subsidiary Body 1 was focused on deepening technical discussion on the current state of play on relevant issues related to cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Dr. John Borrie, Chief of Research, and Dr. John King, Research Fellow of United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) made a presentation on the issue and followed by an interactive discussion.
7. Subsequent four sessions of Subsidiary Body 1 were focused on two areas of work, in accordance with Decision CD/2119, namely: to reach an understanding on the areas of commonalities in the Conference on Disarmament by taking into consideration all relevant views and proposals past, present and future; and consider effective measures, including

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legal instruments for negotiations. The two last sessions of Subsidiary Body 1 were devoted to discussions and considerations of the report.

8. The delegations confirmed their shared commitment to a world without nuclear weapons. However, differences of ways and means to achieve it remain. In spite of these differences, the delegations viewed that the deliberations conducted in Subsidiary Body 1 were in-depth and useful.

9. During the sessions, delegations raised and/or discussed various issues within the scope of Subsidiary Body 1.

10. As tasked by the Decision CD/2119, the Coordinator has drafted and presented a draft report consisting of salient points that transpired during the sessions of the Subsidiary Body 1. However, due to the existence of divergent views and positions of Member States, further work is required to promote convergence among different positions and narrow the gaps on issues relevant to cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament.

11. It is therefore the discussions on the issue of cessation of nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament could be continued during the 2019 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

12. Attached to this report (Annex) is a personal reflection of the Coordinator on the deliberations that took place during the sessions of Subsidiary Body 1. The contents of the Annex are solely the understanding of the Coordinator on various views, perspectives and positions expressed during the discussions and falls within his own responsibility, without prejudice to any Member States' positions.

Annex

Personal Reflection of the Coordinator of Subsidiary Body 1 of the Conference on Disarmament on Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament

A. Deepening technical discussions and broadening areas of agreement, including through the participation, in accordance with the rules of procedure, of relevant experts

1. In order to deepen technical discussion, the Subsidiary body 1 has listened to the presentation by United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) on the current state of play of relevant issues related to cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, as presented by Dr. John Borrie, Chief of Research, and Dr. John King, Research Fellow. The presentation highlighted historical efforts made to regulate or eliminate the use of nuclear weapons through individual, bilateral and multilateral disarmament framework, as well as explore possible steps to be taken to move nuclear disarmament forward. The presentation was followed by an interactive discussion with a view to reaching common understanding on the issues.

2. During the interactive discussion, delegations shared their respective views on the various approaches towards cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. It was emphasized that Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament issues should continue its efforts to contribute positively to international peace and security. In order for the Conference on Disarmament to fulfil its mandate, some delegations underlined the need for constructive dialogues based on confidence and trust among members.

3. Delegations expressed their appreciation to the two experts for their presentations and support future engagement with UNIDIR.

B. Reaching an understanding on the areas of commonalities in the Conference on Disarmament by taking into consideration all relevant views and proposals past, present and future

4. Delegations who are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) reaffirmed the view that it is the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament regime and stressed its role in preventing vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the achievement of nuclear disarmament in accordance with article VI of the Treaty. It was noted that the maintenance of international peace, security and stability, and the achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons as part of an order based on the international law, would require the engagement of all states in an inclusive manner.

5. Approaches towards nuclear disarmament were highlighted during this session. Some delegations expressed support towards a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention, which would set out general obligations, prohibitions and practical arrangements for time-bound, irreversible and effectively verifiable nuclear disarmament. These delegations considered that the process for negotiating such a convention and bringing negotiations to a conclusion should include a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame. They suggested that such a convention would constitute a non-discriminatory and internationally verifiable legal arrangement that would give States assurances that nuclear weapons and all-related facilities had been destroyed in a transparent and irreversible manner and that no new weapons were being produced.

6. Some delegations, on the other hand, considered a framework agreement as a possible option, which would comprise either a set of mutually reinforcing instruments

dealing progressively with various aspects of the nuclear disarmament process, or a chapeau agreement followed by subsidiary agreements or protocols that would lead gradually to a nuclear-weapon-free world. In their opinion such an approach would provide for flexibility, leave room for confidence-building measures and allow for a smooth transition towards nuclear disarmament, simultaneously taking into account the concerns of all States. It would not necessarily include a specific time frame for accomplishing the elimination of nuclear weapons. It was proposed that a first subsidiary agreement or protocol that could be negotiated might be a prohibition on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

7. Meanwhile, several delegations expressed support for a progressive approach. The approach aims at achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons by taking pragmatic and effective steps in a safe and secure manner. It also underlines that the NPT already contains treaty-level obligations and commitments related to nuclear disarmament, linking it to universal and complete disarmament. With the Treaty as the foundation, all its parties, both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States can work together on the building blocks of the global disarmament architecture, starting with the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the commencement of the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The approach further regards that effective, sustainable disarmament must also consider the international security environment, without losing sight of the broader concerns about the risk posed by nuclear weapons. It was also raised that effective disarmament must be inclusive and engage nuclear weapons states who have special responsibilities in this field, in practical ways which build the trust necessary for further reductions. Some delegations viewed that many measures proposed under the progressive approach reflected existing commitments that enjoyed consensus.

8. The adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) on 7 July 2017 was supported by some delegations. They highlighted the legal norm set by the Treaty, which in their view fills a legal gap in the existing legal architecture on nuclear weapons. They emphasized that the TPNW represented an effective measure under Article VI of the NPT by creating a legally binding prohibition on nuclear weapons. It was stressed by them, that the TPNW complemented the NPT and was designed to strengthen existing disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regime.

9. Other delegations expressed their opposition to the TPNW, emphasizing the crucial link between progress on disarmament and the international security environment. They stressed that the TPNW would not contribute to the reduction or limitation of nuclear weapons. Some delegations noted that the TPNW does not reflect customary international law and thus could bind only its parties. Concerns were expressed that the TPNW could create treaty regime inconsistent with the NPT and provoking risk of its erosion.

10. The need to bridge these different views towards the TPNW between Member States was also raised by some delegations during the discussion.

11. Some delegations pointed out the inadmissibility of the practice, abusing the NPT Article I and II, when non-nuclear states participate in the exercises involving for using nuclear weapons, and insisted that it should be stopped.

12. Catastrophic humanitarian consequences of a nuclear weapon detonation were also raised by some delegates with reference to the conferences in Oslo, Norway, Nayarit, Mexico and Vienna, Austria. They drew attention to what they said was the indiscriminate nature of a nuclear weapon detonation. They mentioned that its impact would reach well-beyond national borders and argued that the only way to guard against a nuclear weapon detonation — whether by accident, miscalculation or design — was to ensure the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the assurance that they will never be produced again. In this regard, some delegations expressed their concern over the ongoing modernization programmes of existing nuclear arsenals.

13. Some delegations, whilst acknowledging the importance of the humanitarian dimension, highlighted the primary importance of security considerations, and underlined the need to foster international conditions in which the possession of nuclear weapons would no longer be seen as necessary for the preservation of national and global security.

14. The initiatives to support nuclear disarmament efforts, such as through the Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament, were also raised during the discussion. Some delegations, in this regard, expressed their views that such initiatives provide a venue for interactive discussions involving both Nuclear-Weapon States and Non-Nuclear-Weapon States to find the ground for convergence of different approaches towards a world without nuclear weapons.

C. Considering effective measures, including legal instruments for negotiations

15. During the discussion on consideration of effective measures, including legal instrument for negotiation, delegations who are parties to NPT expressed views that Article VI of the Treaty continues to be the guiding framework for effective measures in nuclear disarmament. Delegations who are parties to the viewed the continued validity of the "13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" agreed in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and the "64-point Action Plan", and in particular its 22 specific actions on nuclear disarmament agreed in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference. Some called for the urgent implementation of steps and actions outlined in those agreed outcome documents.

16. Some delegations highlighted the need to strengthen the cooperation among nuclear-weapon-free zones as a way to achieve effective measure in nuclear weapons prohibition, and establish new ones to contribute towards effective measures. Some delegations underlined that the early establishment of the Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction is a priority as the implementation of the resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the NPT on the Middle East. Some delegations also emphasized the importance of early finalization of the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ).

17. An early negotiation and conclusion of a non-discriminatory, internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices was called for by some delegations as a measure that will contribute to nuclear disarmament. Some delegations noted that negotiations on treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices should be conducted only in the Conference on Disarmament within the framework of a balanced programme of work and on the basis document CD/1299 of March 24th, 1995 and the mandate contained therein. Several delegations said that such a treaty should focus only on banning the future production of fissile material. Some delegations also viewed that pending the conclusion of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive nuclear devices, it is important to maintaining and declaring moratoria on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes. Other delegations were of the view that a treaty dealing with fissile material must cover existing stocks in its scope in order for it to be a genuine and effective measure for nuclear disarmament. These delegations viewed unilateral moratoria on the production of fissile material as being of little value given that these are unverifiable and reversible voluntary measures.

18. Some delegations stressed the urgent need for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument to effectively assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons pending the achievement of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

19. Furthermore, as a concrete step towards the elimination of all nuclear weapons, some delegations stressed the urgency of an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). These delegations called upon the remaining "Annex 2 States" to sign and ratify the CTBT without delay.

20. Some delegations observed the deteriorating international security environment. They stressed the importance of creating conditions that would facilitate further major reductions in nuclear arsenals, including confidence-building measures and efforts to

reduce levels of hostility and tension between states, particularly among those possessing nuclear weapons. Some delegations also viewed that it is important to conduct dialogue to bridge differences of positions among states.

21. Some delegations also noted the contribution of bilateral measures in nuclear disarmament to the substantial progress made to date. Some highlighted the importance of commencing negotiations on a post-New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the United States of America and the Russian Federation.

22. Some delegations underlined that the process of the nuclear disarmament cannot be taken out of the general strategic context and that further progress in this area requires taking into account full range of actors, affecting international security and stability. They emphasized that at the present point of time the efforts of the international community in the sphere of the nuclear disarmament should be concentrated on creating necessary prerequisites for further steps.

23. Some delegations also discussed the contribution of other measures that could contribute to nuclear disarmament including verification, transparency and risk reduction, which are important to the achievement of the verifiability and irreversibility of nuclear disarmament.

24. The role of verification and the need to the development of a verification regime for nuclear disarmament was discussed. Delegations viewed a robust and credible verification and compliance mechanism as an essential element for achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons. According to them, verification is as an important element for ensuring adherence to and compliance with any future arrangements on nuclear disarmament. Some delegations are of the view that nuclear disarmament verification can be best addressed in the context of a specific treaty, and not in an abstract manner or as an end in itself.

25. Several delegations welcomed efforts to develop nuclear disarmament verification capabilities. In that regard, they welcomed the commencement of the work of group of governmental experts to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament, which was established under the General Assembly resolution 71/67. Some delegations stressed the importance of the SSOD-I Final Document; 16 Principles of Verification of the 1998 United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC); works of the two previous Group of Governmental Expert (GGE) in 1990 and 1995; and report of the 2006 UN Panel of Experts as references for a global verification regime.

26. A number of initiatives in the field of verification were also noted by some delegations, including the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), and the on-going UN Group of Governmental Expert (GGE) on nuclear disarmament verification. They viewed the initiatives as avenues to building up trust, identifying and addressing challenges associated with nuclear disarmament verification. Other delegations, however, highlighted that these initiatives are not inclusive, and were established outside the framework of relevant agreements and bodies like the NPT and the Conference on Disarmament.

27. Some delegations stressed that any nuclear disarmament verification regime must strike a balance between national security concerns and the requisite level of access and assurance. Some delegations stressed that nuclear disarmament verification measures may only be envisaged in connection with actual arms control agreements and they should correspond to scale and nature of commitments contracted by the parties. Other delegations pointed that while verification is an important element of nuclear disarmament, it is not a prerequisite for a legally binding instrument on disarmament. Further, several delegations proposed that due to the technical nature of nuclear verification the Conference on Disarmament might conduct dialogue of experts on verification.

28. Several delegations highlighted the value of increased transparency in building confidence, facilitating dialogue, and increasing understanding. They viewed the value in deepening discussion in the Conference on Disarmament on the states' security policies and doctrines.

29. The issue of risk reduction and its linkage with the cessation of nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament were also discussed. The issue of nuclear risk reduction was also discussed as part of the discussion in Subsidiary Body 2 on the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters. Some delegations considered that the risk of accidental, mistaken, unauthorized or intentional nuclear weapon detonations would persist for as long as nuclear weapons exist and that the only way to eliminate this risk is by achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

30. Some delegations highlighted the need for states to take concrete measure to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security doctrine, abandon the nuclear deterrence policy based on first use of nuclear weapons, decrease the operational readiness of nuclear weapons system and refrain from deploying nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear weapon States. Some delegations also called for addressing the linkage between nuclear disarmament and deterrence with conventional forces, weapons and doctrines as well as new types of destabilizing weapons systems. Other delegations pointed to steps already taken to reduce the risk, noting that some proposed steps actually would be de-stabilizing if implemented.

31. The need to further explore and define what is meant under the term "nuclear risk reduction", and also a stand-alone forum within the Conference on Disarmament to discuss those aspects covered by its mandate, was also proposed by several delegations.

Conference on Disarmament

11 September

Original: English

Subsidiary Body 2: Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters

Report

(Adopted at the 1470th plenary meeting on 5 September 2018)

1. By decision CD/2119 of 19 February 2018, the Conference on Disarmament established five subsidiary bodies with a view to make progress on its agenda items. It was agreed that Subsidiary Body 2 would deal with the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters. In accordance with the timetable annexed to decision CD/2126 of 21 March 2018, it was further agreed that the general focus of Subsidiary Body 2 would be on the ban of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. An understanding was also reached that at least one meeting of the Subsidiary Body would be devoted to matters other than the ban of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear devices that fall in the purview of the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.

2. This report reflects the discussions that took place in this body pursuant to its mandate. It acknowledges the deep divergences of views on the different issues.

- Part I reflects the discussions on the part with the general focus on the ban of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.
 - Part I. A reflects the technical discussions held with a view to broadening areas of agreement.
 - Part I. B reflects the discussion on the consideration of effective measures, including legal instruments for negotiations.
- Part II reflects the discussion on the 'prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters' and focuses on matters other than the ban of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. The discussion mainly featured the issue of nuclear risk reduction.
- Part III identifies possible areas of further work on the basis of the discussions in Subsidiary Body 2.

3. Subsidiary Body 2 benefited from the participation of two experts, namely Dr Pavel Podvig, Programme Lead at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, and Sico van der Meer, Research Fellow at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'. Dr Podvig presented 'an overview of activities conducted with a general focus on the ban of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices' and was present to provide expertise at the sessions. Mr van der Meer gave a presentation at the 29 June session on 'reducing nuclear weapons risks: 11 policy options'.

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I. Part I.

A. Technical discussions

General

4. Delegations expressed their views on a ban of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. They stated that a treaty should be non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable. It should practically contribute to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament objectives bearing in mind paragraph 50 (b) of the final outcome document of SSOD-I and lead to undiminished security for all states with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all states to protect their security. It should be effective, practical, and flexible to allow for future developments. Such a treaty remains particularly valuable as an effective measure relating to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and also a means to build trust and confidence among states.

5. Some delegations stated that transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) outside a treaty can be valuable tools. Others stated that TCBMs in themselves, however, are not a substitute for a legally-binding instrument, i.e. a treaty. Delegation expressed that a treaty should not prohibit all production of fissile materials, such as that for civilian use or other non-proscribed uses. Non-diversion of fissile material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices should be ensured. It is important to determine a clear object and purpose for this treaty in considering effective measures. The obligations under a treaty should be in line with the principle of non-discrimination. Important aspects include definitions, verification, and institutional and legal arrangements, which are all interlinked with each other and with the objective and scope of the treaty. The most appropriate international forum to negotiate a treaty is the Conference on Disarmament.

Definitions

6. Delegations expressed their views on the issue of definitions. At the outset, a delegation placed the caveat that discussions on elements of a treaty such as verification, definitions and legal and institutional arrangements are premature as long as there is no full clarity and common vision on the treaty's objective and scope because of the close interlinkages.

7. Delegations stated a treaty should define, inter alia, fissile material, fissile material production; and should clearly delineate the facilities relevant for such a treaty. Definitions will have an impact on the scope, and means and methods of verification. Definitions should ensure that the object and purpose of a treaty can be effectively met.

Scope

8. Delegations expressed their views on the scope of a treaty. Some delegations insisted that the treaty should only focus on banning the future production of fissile material. According to them, the Shannon Report and the mandate contained therein (CD/1299 (1995)), which was agreed by consensus, remains the most relevant and valid basis for conducting negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on such a treaty. The point was made that therefore there was no need for a new mandate. These delegations called for the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the basis of CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein.

9. Other delegations indicated that they were more flexible in terms of scope, whilst a treaty banning future production was the minimum. According to these delegations, a distinction was made with regard to the different categories of existing stocks of fissile materials and some of those categories could be included either as part of the same instrument or in a different arrangement. Also suggestions were made by some delegations as to how to deal with the different categories, such as subjecting some of them only to

verification and not necessarily reduction, whether voluntary or not. According to these delegations, the Shannon Report and the mandate contained therein left sufficient 'constructive ambiguity' as to whether stocks were included in the scope or not.

10. Yet other delegations insisted that the treaty's scope should include future as well as past production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Depending on the category of stocks, they should be subject to the treaty and should either be reduced and/or put under verification. For some of these delegations the Shannon Report and the mandate contained therein were the basis for negotiations as it did not exclude existing stocks, whilst a delegation also expressed the view that the Shannon Report and the mandate contained therein has outlived its utility and validity as the basis for substantive work on a ban as it does not explicitly cover existing stocks. It therefore was argued, by this delegation, that a new mandate was needed.

11. The view was further expressed that the issue of scope and objective of the treaty needs to be addressed prior to starting any negotiations, whilst others were of the view that issue of scope could be addressed as part of the negotiations.

12. Some delegations found it useful to distinguish between different functional categories of fissile materials as the specific views on how to deal with each category could be better expressed. A number of different functional categories were mentioned, such as, fissile materials:

- (a) in civilian use;
- (b) in nuclear weapons;
- (c) in nuclear weapon related activities;
- (d) designated as excess to nuclear weapon requirements;
- (e) released as a result of individual, bilateral or multilateral disarmament arrangements;
- (f) in, or reserved for, non-proscribed military use.

13. In terms of the functional categorisation of fissile materials, a delegation indicated that the concept of 'excess material' may confer legitimacy to the continued acquisition and production of nuclear weapons contrary to nuclear disarmament commitments. Also, some delegations preferred a smaller number of functional categories as adequate for the discussions.

14. There was general agreement that civilian uses and non-proscribed military uses of fissile materials should not be subject to a prohibition. However, the point was made that mechanisms should be put in place to ensure non-diversion of such materials to nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Delegations argued that such arrangements should take into account the concerns of states regarding sensitive information. A broad range of views on the issue of international transfers / acquisition of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices was further expressed by some delegations. Some of them were of the view that such transfers / acquisition go against the purpose of such a treaty, while others argued that if a prohibition on transfers / acquisition is included in the scope of a treaty, logic would demand that the treaty necessarily had to deal with existing stocks.

15. Delegations also discussed how far the treaty could contribute to non-proliferation and disarmament objectives. Some delegations were of the view that the treaty should mainly focus on non-proliferation. Others stressed that it should explicitly be part of the nuclear disarmament regime. For them it was therefore important that at least some of the categories of existing stocks were included in the scope of the treaty. Also, it was mentioned that a treaty that does not encompass stocks of fissile materials within its scope, will not prevent vertical and horizontal proliferation. Others mentioned that the treaty would still cap any future production and hence have a non-proliferation value. Still other delegations expressed the view that a treaty that only deals with future production would also benefit nuclear disarmament because of the possible transparency and verification measures attached to it. (Initial) declarations in this context could also be helpful for future

nuclear disarmament arrangements, it was argued. It was also suggested that the treaty could include a mechanism whereby fissile material resulting from future nuclear disarmament arrangements be made subject to its verification regime to ensure irreversibility.

Verification

16. Several approaches to verification were considered by delegations. Some delegations favoured a focused approach to verification concentrating on enrichment and reprocessing facilities, and downstream facilities processing or handling fissile material. Others argued for a comprehensive approach covering the entire nuclear fuel cycle. Another group of delegations outlined the advantages of a hybrid approach, focusing systematic verification on those areas of the nuclear fuel cycle where the degree of attractiveness for misuse is highest, should a party seek to violate its treaty obligations, but also applying lighter touch measures to other fuel cycle activities taking into account the risks that they may pose for treaty objectives. Advantages and disadvantages of the different approaches were discussed. In that context some delegations mentioned the need for balance between resource efficiency and effectiveness. Also, some delegations expressed the view that duplication with existing safeguards mechanisms and obligations should be avoided. The importance of verification provisions being non-discriminatory was also emphasised.

17. Some delegations noted that the focus of requirements on verification would fall on states with unsafeguarded facilities, as comprehensive safeguards agreements as contained in INFCIRC/153 corrected, and for the relevant states their additional protocols to it, address important aspects of this issue for non-nuclear weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It was also argued that additional measures may still be needed for those latter states. Also, some delegations that are State Party to the NPT expressed the view that provisions of a future treaty should be consistent with existing legal obligations, in particular the NPT.

18. The importance of addressing concerns of states regarding sensitive information in the context of verification was discussed. Delegations stated that a verification regime should take into account the non-proliferation and commercial concerns of States Parties regarding sensitive information and ensure its confidentiality. Some delegations referred to the concept of deferred verification, a 'black box' approach, and forms of managed access to deal with this issue. The point was also made that sensitivities with regard to intellectual property and trade information should also be taken into account.

19. Some delegations expressed the view that the verification toolbox should include routine as well as non-routine inspections. Material accountancy was mentioned as a possible verification measure. Some delegations also addressed the verification of transfers and the importance of declarations in that regard.

20. Delegations voiced their preferences concerning the body that should be tasked with verification. Some delegations preferred a main role for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on verification of a future treaty, whilst others preferred setting up a new body tasked with verification without excluding the possibility of drawing on some IAEA resources.

21. The view was expressed that further technical and scientific examination of areas related to verification are merited in a manner that complements, and not duplicates, work ongoing in other initiatives. The following areas were specified in that regard: 1) technical challenges to verification, 2) mapping out how verification would work in practice under various models, and 3) assessing the resource implications of verification and institutional models. It was also argued that further work on categorisation of production facilities was helpful in order to determine a suitable approach to verification. Although in favour of further scientific work, the point was made that this could be initiated as part of the negotiations of a treaty and did not need to be conducted prior.

Institutional arrangements

22. Delegations were of the view that institutional arrangements will help ensure credibility of the treaty within the international community by inter alia facilitating

effective implementation in order to achieve the object and purpose of such a treaty. Effective institutional arrangements and governance mechanisms will enable set objectives to be met.

B. Consideration of effective measures

23. Many delegations indicated that they were ready to begin negotiations of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices without delay. The view was also expressed that such a treaty should be negotiated as part of a comprehensive and balanced Programme of Work of the Conference on Disarmament. Some delegations expressed that entry-into-force provisions should guarantee that all states with relevant capabilities accede to the treaty.

24. The role and usefulness of TCBMs were also extensively discussed. According to some delegations TCBMs could be valuable in preparing for negotiations, during negotiations and as part of a legally-binding instrument. These did not need to be mutually exclusive. They could help create a climate of trust and confidence. Delegations mentioned a number of examples of what they viewed as TCBMs, although not exhaustive, such as voluntary offer agreements, moratoria on fissile material production for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, irreversible dismantling of fissile material facilities, unilateral declarations, and other forms of information sharing. Some delegations found them useful, although not a substitute for a legally-binding instrument. Others specifically voiced their concern that they were not verifiable or irreversible, hence they were of little value. The voluntarily declared unilateral moratoria on fissile material production for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices were also mentioned in that context. The view was also expressed that they would be a disincentive to negotiate a legally-binding instrument in the first place. The lack of clarity on the scope of such moratoria was also an issue, according to some delegations.

II. Part II: Prevention of nuclear war and other related matters

25. After a presentation by the expert Sico van der Meer on policy options related to reducing nuclear weapons risks, delegations discussed the relevance of this topic for further discussion in the Conference on Disarmament. Many delegations welcomed further discussions on this topic, in particular with a view to current developments in the international security environment. Some delegations expressed the view that further discussions on the security environment and how to improve it may also contribute to nuclear risk reduction. Some delegations pointed to the need to narrow down the scope of possible nuclear risk reduction measures to be discussed, whilst others emphasised the need to better define risks by category and then to define the tools in the toolbox to deal with the respective risks.

26. Amongst others, a number of policy options were mentioned by some delegations and their relevance was discussed: training for nuclear weapons-related emergencies, increased transparency, improving communications, de-targeting, increasing the security of launching systems, de-alerting, increasing decision time, raising the threshold for use including statements on 'no first use' of nuclear weapons, eliminating certain types, limiting numbers and locations, and nuclear disarmament itself. Elaborating on the latter, according to some delegations, the only way to eliminate this risk is by achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

27. Some delegations also raised the issue of nuclear deterrence and how to deal with this in the context of nuclear risk reduction. It was argued by some delegations that nuclear deterrence is obsolete and runs contrary to obligations and commitments to achieve nuclear disarmament. The importance of strategic stability or balance was also mentioned by some delegations, including in relation to general and complete disarmament. The importance of multilateralising the issue of nuclear risk reduction and having a discussion on risks associated with new technologies was also mentioned.

III. Part III: Possible areas of further work

28. During the sessions of Subsidiary Body 2 possible areas of further work of this body were discussed. In relation to the topic of 'the ban of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices', the value of further work was emphasised. Some delegations suggested work on treaty elements, for instance on the technical and scientific aspects, scope, definitions, verification and legal and institutional arrangements or TCBMs.

29. In relation to the topic of prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, also encompassing 'nuclear risk reduction', delegations agreed that further discussion on this topic in the Conference on Disarmament was welcome.

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Subsidiary Body 3: Prevention of an arms race in outer space

Report

(Adopted at the 1470th plenary meeting on 5 September 2018)

I. Current scenario

A. Outer space, peace and security

1. Many intervening members have formulated the need for the CD in its work on PAROS to be guided by the objectives of maintaining a safe, secure, stable and sustainable outer space, and preventing outer space from becoming an area of conflict. Technological developments that are revolutionizing the uses of outer space, together with the expansion of access beyond the traditional spacefaring powers and state actors are both an opportunity and a risk, especially if new capabilities, uses, vulnerabilities and threats are not well understood, monitored and adequately framed


B. Existing normative and institutional framework

2. There was strong emphasis on the Outer Space Treaty as the centerpiece of the legal regime governing the use of outer space for peaceful purposes. Delegations also mentioned the important role of COPUOS as the UN's mandated norm creating body for the peaceful uses of outer space. References were also made to the UN Disarmament Commission's work on the implementation of non-legally binding TCBMs in outer space activities as well as to the role of the UNGA, which has for over 30 years adopted annually resolutions for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Several delegations emphasized the work of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on outer space TCBMs — whose report was adopted by consensus by the UN General Assembly in July 2013, as well as the ongoing GGE established by Resolution 72/250 to "consider and make recommendations on substantial elements of an international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including, inter alia, on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space".

3. Mindful of the mandate of the Conference on Disarmament, there was a general view that the work of the CD on PAROS should build upon and complement the existing normative framework, maintaining full consistency with it. The work of the CD should not duplicate ongoing efforts in other fora, but it should address specific disarmament aspects of some of the same issues.

4. Overarching principles stemming from the OST and other applicable international law, such as that space should be used for peaceful purposes in accordance with international law, and that the exploration and use of outer space must be carried out for the

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benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and that it shall be the province of mankind, are considered to be key. Full adherence to and implementation of existing agreements applicable to outer space are essential.

C. Threats

5. Growth in the amount of human space-activity, coupled with the increased diversity of space operators, fuels the perception that the space domain is becoming increasingly congested and contested. Delegations have expressed concerns both over actions which could trigger misinterpretations and miscalculations as well as over the deliberate and intentional use of force in outer space, from outer space or from terrestrial platforms against outer space objects.

1. Weaponisation of outer space

6. Some delegations pointed at the weaponisation of outer space as their primary concern when dealing with the issue of PAROS. The point was made that, absent legally binding prohibitions, there will always be a risk that conventional or other new types of weaponry can appear in outer space at any moment. The weaponisation of outer space could impair, possibly irreversibly, the peaceful exploration of outer space, give rise to an arms race and negatively impact the global strategic balance and stability, as well as states' security.

2. ASATs

7. Some delegations expressed grave concern over the pursuit and use of anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities. Preventing the development and testing of those capabilities, including those terrestrially based, is a matter of urgency for such delegations. The use or testing of ASATs could create long-lasting clouds of debris which could impair the long-term sustainability of outer space activities. A number of delegations noted that the draft PPWT does not address the use of ASATs, while some other delegations were of the view that the PPWT's provisions on the use of force against space objects deal with this aspect.

3. Other threats (jamming, blinding, collision as a weapon, etc.)

8. During the discussions, other threats to peace and security in outer space were evoked. Delegations and experts mentioned the use of electronic warfare to overwhelm satellites and affect their functioning; the use of laser beams to damage optical sensors; the possibility of using satellite-servicing space objects to move or damage space objects; and the possibility of using a deliberate and intentional collision as a means of damaging or destroying a space object. The point was made that the technology behind at least some of these threats is dual-use by nature. There are systems that have legitimate, beneficial uses, but that are also inherently capable of being used to interfere with other operators' space systems, adding further layers of complexity to risk and threat assessments and possible regulation.

II. PAROS toolbox

A. Role and sufficiency of existing regulations

9. For some, the existing legal framework, specifically the Outer Space Treaty, is sufficient in addressing PAROS. The outer space treaties provide common ground, and fully adhering to and implementing the existing framework would be of essence. Practicable measures to implement space-related principles and guidelines endorsed on the basis of consensus by the United Nations General Assembly seem to garner widespread support. But the contrast between the speedy development and changes in outer space activities and the relatively slower process of development of rules, norms and standards applicable to them can potentially generate gaps that may need to be addressed. For others,

therefore, the existing treaties are insufficient to keep outer space safe and secure by reducing vulnerabilities to threats and risks and preventing what could amount to an arms race in outer space, and additional international rules would be called for.

10. Some delegations were of the view that there is a fundamental question as to whether the existing treaties on outer space are sufficient to deal with the generally perceived growing risks and threats associated with an arms race in outer space. They noted that the existing treaties only prohibit nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction from being placed, and tested, in outer space. They recalled that there is no prohibition regarding placement of conventional weapons in space or the use of ground-based weapons against space assets and that there is no prohibition on the development and testing of these weapons. Against this backdrop, these delegations were of the view PAROS should be discussed and pursued in conformity with the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty, which serves as the cornerstone of the legal regime applicable to outer space.

1. Definitions

11. The substantive matter of what constitutes a peaceful use of outer space in order to identify and sanction non-peaceful uses of outer space that are threatening or hostile has been put forward, thus highlighting an inherent interplay between the CD and the Committee on the Peaceful uses of Outer Space – COPUOS, and the need for a coordinated approach to space issues across the spectrum of UN bodies and relevant space fora and expertise.

12. The definition of items/objects to be controlled and behavior to be regulated seems to be important for an effective and verifiable agreement preventing the placement of weapons in outer space, alongside restrictions on undesirable behavior within the context of PAROS. Terms would have to be carefully defined so as not to unintentionally capture objects or behaviors that should not be constrained, and in order to safeguard peaceful and beneficial activities in outer space. Such definitions should meet a high standard of clarity from a technical, legal and political standpoint, should necessarily be consensual, and should be construed in a manner that would not stifle legitimate space activities nor lead to disagreement/misperceptions that can create uncertainty as to compliance, and possibly foment tensions and conflict, instead of preventing or mitigating them. The challenges involved therein have been highlighted, with the view being expressed that at the current juncture it is not possible to craft definitions that would satisfy everyone's concerns and not unduly or unfairly constrain civil or commercial space activities. Others, however, assume that there would be no inherent obstacle to formulating and agreeing on definitions that could meet the objectives stated above, with specific language being proposed. The draft PPWT, for instance, defines "weapon in space" as "any outer space object or component thereof which has been produced or converted to destroy, damage or disrupt the normal functioning of objects in outer space...", though there is no agreement on this proposal.

2. Self-defense

13. Mention has been made to Article 51 of the UN Charter to the effect that it establishes the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs. On the other hand, some thought greater clarity should be sought with respect to its relevance and applicability to PAROS as a matter of international law. For some delegations the applicability of the inherent right to individual or collective self-defense in outer space, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, defeats the purpose and object of PAROS. For these delegations, there is an inherent inconsistency between the use of force in outer space, including for self-defense, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

B. Risk reduction

14. Working together to reduce risks to space objects in their role as critical global infrastructure and ensuring within UN disarmament fora that everyone can benefit from the use of space has been considered important. For some delegations, the use of force, in

particular destructive force, should be discussed in the CD in the context of PAROS, including in connection with the risk it poses of increasing long lasting debris in space that may harmfully interfere with activities of other states and affect space security. There seems to be concern that misinterpretation of intentions behind certain actions in outer space in today's more challenging security landscape may trigger dangerous miscalculations, adding an element of risk against the backdrop of what some members describe as the return to great power competition.

15. Some seem to support addressing the responsible behavior of states in respect of PAROS, rather than dealing with certain actions or weapons. There is the approach that irresponsible behavior is of concern to all states, and that safety, security and sustainability of outer space needs to be protected by all states and for all states. The point was made that principles of responsible behavior should be globally shaped using universal, multilateral, and non-discriminatory approaches in the relevant fora. Views were expressed that norms that build transparency and trust can strengthen existing international standards governing outer space, increase mutual understanding and reduce tensions. It was recalled that such norms can be legally or non-legally binding.

C. TCBMS

16. TCBMs have been generally considered as relevant and necessary for PAROS. Delegations supported the consensus outcome of the 2013 GGE and expressed satisfaction with the UNDC taking up work on practical recommendations for the implementation of the recommendations contained in that report with the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space. Though concerns have been expressed with respect to duplication, some members see TCBMs, including codes of conduct, as also relevant for the CD to discharge its mandate on one of the core issues of its agenda. TCBMs are considered by some delegations a potential interim near-term outcome in the CD, without prejudice to or as an intermediate step towards other subsequent more substantive undertakings, including legally binding obligations.

17. TCBMs have also been described, by some, as a complement to other initiatives, including a comprehensive, effective, and verifiable legally binding treaty. TCBMs, according to them, would spur trust and confidence amongst members and, in this respect, could be considered a stepping-stone towards the negotiation of new norms on PAROS in the CD. Some who recognize the value of TCBMs espouse the view, however, that they cannot be a substitute for legally-binding treaty-based obligations. For others, TCBMs could also be pursued within a legally-binding agreement/agreements.

18. Cooperative approaches to information sharing, common and practical approaches to specific standards, processes, and practices, timeliness of critical information about space objects and hazards, as well as other political measures such as unilateral declarations, bilateral commitments, a multilateral code of conduct and best practices were mentioned by some delegations as options to be further explored. References were also made to UNGA resolutions, commitments, and pledges regarding no first placement of weapons in outer space. The evolution of the NFP initiative into a multilateral configuration has been underlined, although doubts were raised with regard to the practical value of NFP, particularly if decoupled from other issues of concern. Some delegations expressed the view that it is not possible to confirm a country's adherence to NFP.

19. Capacity-building and international cooperation, particularly for developing countries, though the domain of COPUOS in the context of the peaceful uses of outer space, could also be relevant as a contribution to PAROS, independently of the degree of commitment one decides to pursue within the CD, whether TCBMs only, a legally-binding treaty or some combination of both. The prevention of an arms race in outer space is critical to ensure the use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all countries, independently of their levels of economic and scientific development. Capacity building and international cooperation towards this goal seem to be an important component of any undertaking in the CD on PAROS.

D. Legally binding measures

1. PPWT

20. Several members consider the draft PPWT as a basis for the negotiation of a legally binding treaty in the CD, notwithstanding the need to deepen discussions on many questions regarding the proposal. Some members caution against placing the burden of any such treaty asymmetrically upon developing countries or discriminatory restrictions being raised against their peaceful use of outer space. For some delegations, the only way to avert the dangers associated with the weaponisation of outer space is to adopt effective legally binding measures on PAROS in the CD. Though the PPWT is not considered by proponents to solve all issues related to space security, they maintain that a space free of weapons would be a key contribution towards this goal, as well as prohibiting any hostile action against space objects. Some other delegations insist that the PPWT is fundamentally flawed by not being equitable, effectively verifiable and that it negatively impacts their national security. As a basis for the consideration of a treaty, the draft PPWT is currently the only proposal made in the CD.

2. Verification and monitoring

21. There is support for the development of a verification regime, and, for some, monitoring, whatever the agreement envisioned. For some, the idea of dealing with verification issues in a sequenced approach, through protocols to be elaborated/negotiated ex-post, is insufficient, and the view was expressed that effective verification for a PAROS instrument would not be achievable at the present time.

22. Views were also expressed that voluntary TCBMs could lay the foundation for future verification/monitoring of legally binding commitments.

III. Way forward

A. Complementarity of different approaches and possible pathways for progress

23. There is a shared concern regarding the increasing threats to peace and security in outer space and a common understanding that an arms race in outer space would gravely affect the global security landscape. Even though approaches to address these issues differ, there is a sense of urgency which indicates that progress on PAROS is not only possible, but necessary. Elements of commonality between member States include the necessity to reduce risks and increase confidence, widespread concern with the formation of space debris from tests or the use of force in outer space, concern with the possibility of the weaponization of outer space and dealing with the dual-use nature of many space objects, the positive role of TCBMs, the importance of verification/monitoring, and of capacity building and international cooperation. Although consensus on the immediate negotiation of a legally binding instrument could not be established, and there were some doubts about the feasibility of such an instrument, particularly with regard to the issues of definitions, verification and dual use technologies, relevant and substantive elements for further consideration of the CD may be extracted from the discussions.

B. Issues for possible further consideration in the CD

- Reducing risks to space objects and their vital role to prevent conflict, ensuring that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried on for the benefit of all peoples.
- Preventing misinterpretation of intentions behind certain actions in outer space that may trigger dangerous miscalculations in today's increasingly volatile space security landscape exposed to great power competition.

- Definitions:
 - Outer Space (important but perhaps not indispensable for making normative progress).
 - objects / behavior to be controlled, limited or prohibited;
 - a weapon in space;
 - terrestrially-based weapons that threaten space security;
 - peaceful versus non-peaceful, threatening or hostile uses of outer space.
 - Reducing the threat to space security posed by dual-use space and terrestrially-based objects.
 - Reducing threats to space security from lasting debris and from systems of debris collection.
 - Safeguarding legitimate space activities against ambiguous normative constructs related to PAROS that may stifle their development.
 - Effective arms control, limitation or prohibition measures that would contribute to PAROS, and their scope (development, testing, transfer, possession, placement, deployment, use, etc.), addressing space and terrestrially-based capabilities as well as cyber capabilities.
 - Verification and monitoring with respect to PAROS-related undertakings.
 - Deepening discussions on UN Charter's Article 51 (and other relevant elements of international law) in the context of PAROS.
 - Capacity-building and international cooperation dimensions of PAROS to the benefit, in particular, of developing countries.
 - Options for an agreement or agreements on PAROS in the CD, recognizing options can be built upon and are not mutually exclusive.
-

Conference on Disarmament

11 September

Original: English

Subsidiary Body 5

Report

(Adopted at the 1470th plenary meeting on 5 September 2018)

I. Mandate and scope of the Subsidiary Body 5

1. At the 1442nd plenary meeting on 16 February 2018 the Conference on Disarmament adopted the decision CD/2119 to establish five subsidiary bodies with a mandate to pursue the following areas and any other area: agreed by the subsidiary bodies, in accordance with the rules of procedure:

(a) To reach an understanding on the areas of commonalities in the Conference on Disarmament by taking into consideration all relevant views and proposals past, present and future;

(b) Deepening technical discussions and broadening areas of agreement, including through the participation, in accordance with the rules of procedure, of relevant experts;

(c) Consider effective measures, including legal instruments for negotiations.

2. The Conference decided that Subsidiary Body 5 will consider the following issues:

- New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons;
- Comprehensive programme of disarmament;
- Transparency in armament; and
- Emerging and other issues relevant to the substantive work of the Conference could also be considered, in accordance with decision CD/2119.

II. Organization of work

3. At the 1455th plenary meeting of the Conference, on 27 March 2018, the Conference on Disarmament by decision CD/2126 approved the schedule of meetings of the Subsidiary body 5.

4. In accordance with the decision CD/2126 the Subsidiary body 5 held 7 meetings.

5. On May 17 and 18, 2018, the Member States were provided with an opportunity to have general exchange of views on the items under consideration.

6. On June 19 – 21, 2018, thematic in-depth discussions were held with the participation of invited experts.



7. On August 23, 2018, general debate on the outcomes of the work of the Subsidiary body 5 was held.
8. The following experts took part in the thematic in-depth discussions:
 - on science and technology developments that can lead to new types of WMD or consequences comparable to the use of WMD – Ambassador Sergey Batsanov (Pugwash Conferences), Dr. Pavel Podvig (UNIDIR), Dr. Filippa Lentzos (King's College, London);
 - on weaponization of artificial intelligence and cyber security – Ambassador Amandeep Singh Gill (Chair of the GGE on LAWS, CCW), Ms. Kerstin Vignard (UNIDIR), Dr. Jean-Marc Rickli (GCSP);
 - on risk of obtaining WMDs by non-state groups – Dr. Jean Pascal Zanders (The Trench);
 - on promoting comprehensive disarmament and transparency (including strengthening confidence-building measures) – Ms. Silvia Mercogliano (UNODA, Geneva Branch), Mr. Mark Finaud (GCSP), Dr. Mohammad Hassan Daryaei (CTBTO Preparatory Commission).

III. Outcomes of discussions

A. Developments in science and technology

9. Some delegations stated that science and technology developments at the current moment cannot lead to emerging of new types of WMDs. However, future prospective of development of new weapons with characteristics, comparable to nuclear or chemical weapons, was outlined by some delegations during the discussions.
10. Some delegations suggested that there should be better oversight and regulations on scientific research, and called for a code of conduct for scientists. In this context some delegations called for evaluations of developments in science and technology, which have an impact on international security.
11. Some other delegations suggested that the CD could examine ways of taking concrete action to monitor the relevant developments in science and technologies in light of the UN GA Resolution A/RES/72/28 "Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament".
12. The following ideas were outlined by some delegations as well:
 - on establishment of a review board to assess the impact of science and technology,
 - on development and adoption of international binding agreements to ban the creation of new types of weapons of mass destruction through new scientific discoveries.

B. ICT and cyber security

13. On ICT and Cyber Security issues some delegations noted that significant progress had already been made on these issues in the context of the Group of Government Experts (GGE) on Information and Communication Technology in the Context of International Security, citing reports from 2010, 2013 and 2015, endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly.
14. Despite the lack of consensus in the previous GGE, established by General Assembly resolution 70/237, delegations noted this did not diminish the importance of the 2010, 2013, and 2015 GGE reports and encouraged the continued implementation of the recommendations contained in those reports.
15. Some Member States noted that the 2015 GGE in its consensus report affirmed (A/70/174) the applicability of international law, including the United Nations Charter, to

the States' activities in cyber space. Other delegations noted that existing law, although applicable, is not sufficient, therefore a multilateral response is needed to develop new international law.

16. Some Member States expressed a desire to establish a new round of the GGE with a mandate to continue the work of that process, build upon the previous three GGE reports, and encourage the existing reports' implementation by all Member States.

17. The Conference was also reminded of an initiative to convene a small group under the auspices of the UNGA First Committee to review implementation of the recommendations contained in the 2010, 2013, and 2015 GGE reports and develop ideas to support further implementation of the recommendations and present a consensus report to the 75th General Assembly in 2020, based on input obtained in regular, inter-sessional consultations with the wider membership and other interested stakeholders.

18. Some delegations noted that the conditions for negotiating relevant international norms are emerging and called for the development of a legally binding framework to be negotiated within the framework of the United Nations.

19. Some delegations added that despite its unique characteristics, international security in cyber space is essentially not different from traditional arms control and the CD is the appropriate platform for discussing the issue.

20. Other delegations noted that they do not support negotiations of an arms control regime for cyber space, adding that the disarmament paradigm is not appropriate for a "dual use" environment such as cyber space.

21. A view was expressed that efforts in other fora shouldn't be affected by discussions on cyber in the CD. Some delegations did not believe there is currently any need to consolidate discussions in other fora under a single platform or look to include these issues as a new agenda item in the CD.

22. Some delegations added that it is the legitimate right of any State to research and develop offensive cyber capabilities for use in accordance with international law.

23. In response to arguments in favor of the legitimate right of States to develop offensive cyber capabilities, it was mentioned, that there is no definition to what constitutes a cyber weapon, and that international law applies to States behavior in the ICT environment, particularly in relation to the threat and use of force, while noting the lack of consensus on how to apply the right to self-defense according to Article 51 of the UN Charter in response to what some States may describe as cyber-attack.

24. ICT and cyber security issues were evaluated by some delegations as cross-cutting and affecting, directly or indirectly, many aspects of disarmament and international security, including nuclear deterrence, space security, transparency and verification. Concerns about risks, that might be posed by interlinkage between ICTs and WMDs were expressed as well.

C. Weaponization of Artificial Intelligence (AI)

25. While discussing weaponization of artificial intelligence a number of delegations noted that the weaponization of AI, including the development of LAWS reduced the role of humans with regard to decision making on the use of lethal force in warfare, thereby lowering the threshold for the use of force. Some delegations called for a pre-emptive ban on LAWS as a protocol under the Convention of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and a moratorium on the development of LAWS pending the negotiation of such a protocol.

26. Other delegations called a ban on LAWS premature as AI could contribute to reduce civilian casualties and noted that the private sector is making great strides in this field. It was added that the time is not yet ripe for the negotiation of a political declaration or legally binding instrument.

27. Some Member States noted risks of non-state actors obtaining or weaponizing AI and called for the development of international norms. It was underlined that existing law is

applicable, while the challenges in applying existing law to new phenomena, which could require the development of new legal norms, were noted.

28. Some delegations were of the view that the CCW is the most appropriate forum to address the issue of LAWS and warned against duplication in the CD. They noted the ongoing work in the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (GGE on LAWS) under the CCW. New weapons systems are by definition evolving, and pertain to areas of knowledge on which the expertise must be deepened. Necessity for maturation and therefore in-depth informal discussions was outlined as well.

29. Some delegations expressed the view that LAWS and AI issues could also be discussed in the CD without duplication.

30. Some delegations stated that issues of weaponization of artificial intelligence were found cross-cutting and affecting, directly or indirectly, many aspects of disarmament and international security, including nuclear deterrence and space security.

D. Risks of obtaining Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by non-state actors

31. While there were concerns expressed with regard to other actors that may have potential malicious application of dual-use technologies, the main focus of discussions was on WMD-terrorism.

32. Some delegations expressed their support for the proposal to draft an International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Chemical and Biological Terrorism (ICCBT). It was argued by them that WMD-terrorism has become a tragic reality and added that existing mechanisms such as Security Council Resolution 1540, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) are not sufficient to counter the threat stemming from non-state actors.

33. Other delegations reaffirmed their reservations on or opposition to the proposed ICCBT and argued that a new convention is unnecessary and would duplicate existing efforts ongoing under such agreements as the CWC, BWC, and Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) to address the non-state actor threat. Any efforts on this matter need to take into account and to preserve the authority and credibility of existing instruments.

34. Some delegations, while not commenting on the ICCBT, noted the risks stemming from WMD-terrorism and underlined the need to secure sensitive materials.

E. General and complete disarmament, transparency

35. Support to the general and complete disarmament under effective international control was expressed at the meetings.

36. It was argued by some, that transparency and confidence building measures are no substitute for legally-binding instruments. Some delegations argued that nuclear weapon States should attach high importance to implementation of transparency measures on their nuclear weapons arsenals in light of the priority to achieve and maintain a nuclear weapon free world.

37. There were calls by some delegations for a new non-discriminatory and equitable export control regime open to all States, which in their views is an appropriate way of dealing with what they consider the lowered threshold for Research and Development of technology whereby States and entities obtain the relevant capacities to develop and maintain sensitive technologies and materials.

IV. Way forward

38. The discussions revealed very different approaches of Member States on how to address these issues, as well as on possibilities to discuss these issues within the CD and on the possible role of the Conference.

39. Therefore, notwithstanding, that none of the issues under consideration gained necessary level of maturity to start negotiations or were even supported as negotiations, the conditions for more in-depth discussions are emerging.

40. This resulted in a view, that the issues, related to mandate and scope of the Subsidiary Body 5 could be addressed further.

Conference on Disarmament

13 September

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
Note Verbale dated 10 September 2018 from the Permanent Missions of the Republic of Kazakhstan addressed to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting the text of the Joint Statement by H.E. Mr. Kairat Abdrakhmanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Dr. Lassina Zerbo, Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) and the Declaration adopted in Astana during the 2018 CTBTO Group of Eminent Persons – Youth International Conference "Remembering the past, looking to the future" which was held on August 28 – September 2, 2018.

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the United Nations and other International Organizations in Geneva presents its compliments to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honor to transmit herewith the text of the Joint Statement by H.E. Mr. Kairat Abdrakhmanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Dr. Lassina Zerbo, Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) and the Declaration adopted in Astana during the 2018 CTBTO Group of Eminent Persons — Youth International Conference "Remembering the past, looking to the future" which was held on August 28 — September 2, 2018.

In this regard the Permanent Mission requests that the Joint Statement and the Declaration to be issued and circulated as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Permanent Mission avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament the assurances of its highest consideration.

GE.18-15213(E)



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**Joint Statement by H.E. Mr. Kairat Abdrakhmanov,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan,
and Dr. Lassina Zerbo, Executive Secretary of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
(CTBTO)**

Astana

29 August 2018

1. On the occasion of the International Day against Nuclear Tests proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly at the initiative of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev, we reaffirm our commitment to realizing a world free of nuclear testing and renew our resolve to achieve the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). It is a symbolic day for Kazakhstan because of the closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site in 1991.

2. A historic decision to close the Semipalatinsk testing site, which was made by the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev on 29 August 1991, sent a strong political message and contributed to the international efforts that led to the adoption of the CTBT in 1996. Over the years, Kazakhstan has provided strong support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) and demonstrated determination to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons. In 2008, the CTBTO held the first large-scale on-site inspection (OSI) integrated field exercise in Semey. In 2015-2017 Kazakhstan, together with Japan, co-chaired the CTBT Article XIV Process to facilitate speedy entry into force of the Treaty.

3. Kazakhstan, as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for 2017-2018, is tirelessly supporting international efforts aimed at strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, highlighting the danger that nuclear weapons pose to global peace and stability.

4. Kazakhstan and the CTBTO invite all States to take part in commemorating the International Day against Nuclear Tests and advance the much needed entry into force of the CTBT, which is considered to be a crucial instrument of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

5. We believe that the International Conference of the CTBTO Youth Group and Group of Eminent Persons under the theme "Remembering the past, looking to the future" (the Astana Conference) will be helpful in raising public awareness of the dangerous consequences of the use of nuclear testing.

6. We dedicate ourselves individually and jointly to realizing this goal towards nuclear disarmament.

7. We call on all States Signatories to spare no effort to ensure that the nuclear test ban becomes legally binding by achieving the entry into force of the CTBT. We also call on all States to continue the moratoria on nuclear test explosions.

8. We urge those States that have not yet signed or ratified the Treaty to do so without delay. We especially call on the remaining eight CTBT Annex 2 States, whose ratifications are needed for the Treaty's entry into force, to demonstrate leadership by taking this important step.

9. It is high time to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force. We owe it to ourselves, and to future generations.

Kazakhstan Conference Declaration

On the occasion of the International Day against Nuclear Tests, which is observed each year on 29 August, a joint meeting between the Group of Eminent Persons (GEM) and the Youth Group (CYG) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) took place in Astana, at the invitation of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Under the banner of the 2018 CTBTO GEM-Youth International Conference "Remembering the past, looking to the future", the participants reaffirmed their commitment to advance a world free of nuclear testing, bearing in mind the human and environmental legacy of nuclear weapon test explosions, and their resolve in enhancing cooperation to promote the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty's (CTBT) long awaited entry into force.

Kazakhstan Conference participants collectively:

1. Express their gratitude to the Government of Kazakhstan for its unwavering commitment to promoting the CTBT, recognizing the closing of the Semipalatinsk test site as a milestone in global non-proliferation and disarmament history;
2. Recognize that the CTBT constitutes the most effective and practical non-proliferation and disarmament measure within grasp of the international community;
3. Call upon all States to continue their support in advancing the entry into force of the Treaty as the most practical step towards nuclear disarmament, notably during the upcoming 2020 NPT Review Conference;
4. Recall United Nations Security Council Resolution 2310 (2016) which urges all States that have either not signed or not ratified the Treaty, particularly the eight remaining Annex 2 States, to do so without further delay and encourages all States Signatories to promote the universality and entry into force of the Treaty;
5. Commit to place the CTBT on the agenda of the world's most important events and to conduct tailored outreach work in line with the 2018-2019 plan of action adopted at the conference;
6. Invite the international community to consider making use of the available expertise and monitoring technologies of the Commission worldwide including in the Korean Peninsula;
7. Emphasize the role of parliamentarians, civil society, academia and youth to develop tailored strategies for increased regional support for the CTBT and its universalization;
8. Stress the important role of youth in promoting the CTBT and, in particular, the activities of the CYG;
9. Recognize the overarching objective of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons and highlight the importance of first achieving the key precondition for this - a world without nuclear testing;
10. Note the potential contribution of the CTBT and its verification regime to Disaster Risk Reduction and the advancement of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals;
11. Encourage further promotion of the science diplomacy nexus through concrete CTBTO capacity building projects;
12. Decide to pursue close coordination and collaboration between the CTBTO Group of Eminent Persons (GEM) and the CTBTO Youth Group (CYG);

13. Recognize States support through voluntary contributions for capacity building projects focusing on the next generation of policy and scientific leaders and encourage further such contribution.
-

Conference on Disarmament

13 September

Original: English

Letter dated 15 February 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cyprus addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament with regard to the issue raised in document CD/2117.

Excellency,

I have the honour to inform you that the position of the Republic of Cyprus with regard to the issue raised in document CD/2117 (dated 29 January 2018) of the Conference on Disarmament remains the same as expressed in our letters which had been distributed as documents of the Conference on Disarmament under reference CD/1439 (dated 13 December 1996) and CD/1740 (dated 15 July 2004) respectively.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the text of the present letter to be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Mr. George C. Kasoulides

GE.18-15206(E)



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Conference on Disarmament

14 September


Original: English

Note Verbale dated 12 September 2018 from the Permanent Mission of the Group of 21 (G-21), namely: Algeria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tunisia, Venezuela, Vietnam and Zimbabwe addressed to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting the text of the statement of the G-21 concerning the need to uphold the Rules of Procedure and the office of the president of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Permanent Missions of the Group of 21 (G-21), namely: Algeria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tunisia, Venezuela, Vietnam and Zimbabwe to the United Nations in Geneva present their compliments to the Office for Disarmament Affairs, in its capacity as the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament, and have the honour to circulate the attached text of the statement of the G-21 concerning the need to uphold the Rules of Procedure and the office of the president of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Permanent Missions of the G-21 request that the attached G-21 statement be registered and circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Permanent Missions of the Group of 21 (G-21), namely: Algeria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tunisia, Venezuela, Vietnam and Zimbabwe avail themselves of this opportunity to renew to the Office for Disarmament Affairs, in its capacity as the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament, the assurances of their highest consideration.



Position of the Group of 21 concerning the need to uphold the Rules of Procedure and the Office of the President of the Conference on Disarmament

1. The G21 wish to note with appreciation that, as we approach the end of the 3rd Part of the Conference on Disarmament for 2018, the Turkish presidency will be crowned with success, given its already demonstrated exceptional diplomatic skill, efficiency and commitment in the stewardship of the affairs of the Conference. The G21 stands ready to render all the support and co-operation for the successful discharge of this mandate, especially on the finalisation and submission of our Annual Report to the United Nations General Assembly, including the reports of the subsidiary bodies in accordance with the decision CD/2119.

2. The G21 would like to re-state some principles and rules which should guide the work of the Conference in the exercise we are currently engaged in. The G21, with regard to the work of the Conference on Disarmament, would like to stress as a fundamental principle, the upholding of the Rules of Procedure and the office of the Presidency.

3. This principle is also reflected in Rule 3 (three):

"All member States of the Conference shall take part in its work in conditions of full equality as independent States, in accordance with the principle of sovereign equality enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations."

4. And this principle is implied in Rule 9 (nine):

"When the Conference is in session, the Presidency of the Conference shall rotate among all its members; each President shall preside for a four-working-week period. The rotation which began in January 1979, based on the English alphabetical list of membership, shall be followed."

5. With regard to how we reflect the views of Members in the reports, Rule 45 is clear and states: "The reports of the Conference shall be factual and reflect the negotiations and work of the Conference."

6. We believe the best way to uphold the institution of the CD is by respecting the Rules of Procedure and office of the President. In this regard, Rule 9 of the Rules of Procedure should not be questioned.

Conference on Disarmament

14 September 2018

Original: English

Note Verbale dated 13 September 2018 from the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic addressed to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting the text of the Statement by the Syrian Arab Republic in response on baseless allegations regarding CD Presidency on US -UK – France repeated violations of International Law in light of their military aggression on the Syrian Arab Republic and their support to terrorism in Syria.

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations in Geneva, presents its compliments to the Office for Disarmament Affairs, in its capacity as the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament, and has the honour to attach herewith the Statement by the Syrian Arab Republic in response to baseless allegations regarding CD Presidency, and on US - UK - France repeated violations of International Law in light of their military aggression on the Syrian Arab Republic and their support to terrorism in Syria.

The Permanent Mission requests that the attached statement be registered and circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and be included in the annual report of the CD.

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations in Geneva avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Office for Disarmament Affairs, in its capacity as the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament, the assurances of its highest consideration.

GE.18-15307(E)



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Statement by the Syrian Arab Republic on the US disinformation campaign in the Conference on Disarmament.

1. The statement consigned by a number of CD members comes in the context of a demonization campaign against the Syrian Arab Republic in different UN forums. The majority of the co-signers are part of the war against Syria, and are, therefore, not morally fit to preach about international law violations. Those countries are involved in repeated acts or threats of military aggression against Syria, occupation of Syrian territories, support of terrorism, and deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure inside Syria. The American-led illegal military coalition, which operates without any authorization from Security Council or the Syrian Government, has committed war crimes, as American and allied air strikes caused the death of thousands of civilians and the total destruction of the city of Raqqa. US, UK and France were involved in military aggression against Syria in blatant violation of UN Charter and international law. Support to different Al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist groups by US and its allies in the region, and the involvement of some other European countries in illegal shipments of arms and ammunitions to terrorist groups, is public and documented. American, Turkish and Israeli illegal occupation of parts of the Syrian Territory is also another aspect of prolonging the conflict.
2. The Syrian Arab Republic has repeatedly condemned the use of chemical weapons anywhere, anytime and under any circumstances. We have repeatedly confirmed that Syria does not possess chemical weapons and has eliminated its chemical program under the supervision of OPCW, as was confirmed in June 2014 to Security Council by the head of UN/OPCW mission Ms. Sigrid Kaag. Questions relating to the Syrian national declaration are duly discussed within the OPCW.
3. As for the question related to NPT, we expect the US and its allies to condemn the Israeli attack on the Syrian Military site instead of blaming Syria, and to put pressure Israel to cooperate with IAEA to clarify the pending questions.
4. As regards the content of the above mentioned statement, I would like to make the following observations:
5. The statement runs counter to the CD Rules of Procedures which guide the work of the Conference. We find it particularly regrettable that the holder of the current presidency of the Conference has decided to take side and subscribe to a controversial demarche which adds to further polarization and division inside the Conference, instead of working to bridge the gaps and ensure consensus on CD annual report.
6. The statement raises issues from outside the purview of the CD and its agenda, role and mandate, and drifts of the Conference into the mandates of other multilateral bodies. The Conference on Disarmament, which was recognized by the first Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly as the "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum", should stick to its mandate and refrain from interfering in the functioning of Conventions and their competent mechanisms and allow them space to discharge their respective mandates, without interference. If serious, countries which claim concerns about the use of chemical weapons should allow starting serious negotiations in the CD on a legally binding instrument against the use of chemical weapons by terrorist groups.
7. CD members who chose to embark on media campaigns outside the CD Chamber against the Presidency, and chose to systematically undermine the efforts of the ONLY President which worked seriously during 2018 Session to seek consensus on a Program of Work, in implementation of his duties under the Rules of Procedures, did not respect neither rule 9 of the Rules of Procedures, nor rule 3 which provides for the principle of sovereign equality of all nations.
8. The statement confirms that its co-signers did in fact try to undermine the work of the Conference for four weeks of its session and to take it hostage to their political agenda and considerations. Furthermore, coordinators of subsidiary bodies 2 and 4, both co-signers

of the letter, opted for national positions in implementing their mandate and contributed to efforts aimed at undermining the role and authority of the CD.

9. Issues of moral authority and political legitimacy, raised by some members have no regard for the integrity of the high office of the Presidency of the Conference and its Rules of Procedure. Countries which have used chemical, biological and nuclear weapons across their history have no moral legitimacy to judge other countries. The best way to uphold the moral authority of the Conference is not by undermining the office of the Presidency and the Rules of Procedure, but by respecting the institution and its rules. It should be recalled in this regard that introducing extraneous issues as criteria for suitability for CD Presidency is totally absurd. It is totally absurd that Israel, which remains the main threat to the security and stability in the Middle East as the only party in the region which refuses to accede all WMDs prohibition or non-proliferation conventions and continues to possess all types of WMDs, finds itself legally and morally eligible to co-sign the letter and preach the need to maintain international non-proliferation regimes!!! It is further ironic that the three countries which blocked NPT 2015 Review Conference from adopting its final declaration find themselves eligible to preach about the fitness of other countries.

Conference on Disarmament

14 September 2018

Original: English


Note Verbale dated 14 September 2018 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting the text of the statement delivered by H.E. Mr. Esmail Baghaei, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the plenary session of the Conference on Disarmament on 14 September 2018.

The Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Office and other international organizations in Geneva presents its compliments to the Office for Disarmament Affairs in its capacity as the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honor to attach a copy of the statement delivered by H.E. Mr. Esmail Baghaei, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the plenary session of the Conference on Disarmament on 14 September 2018. It is kindly requested that the statement be registered as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Office for Disarmament Affairs the assurances of its highest consideration.

(Signed) Mr. Esmail Baghaei

GE.18-15692(E)



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Statement by Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran before the Conference on Disarmament

Geneva, 14 September 2018

Madam President,

The delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran would like to align itself with the statement made by distinguished delegate of Zimbabwe on behalf of Group 21.

In my short remarks yesterday morning, I stressed the need to avoid politicization of our reporting scheme and to steer clear of dangerous precedent-setting notions which could corrode the Conference on Disarmament long established procedures and adversely affect the overall functioning of the Conference. I was heartened to see many delegations made a reference more than once to the Conference on Disarmament Rules of Procedures and the need to observe it. I wish their position in this respect would be consistent.

I would like to reiterate our firm and principled position that the Conference of Disarmament Rules of Procedures must be respected. And in this regard let me share with you a couple of points:

1. The controversy created over the Presidency of Syrian Arab Republic in the Conference of Disarmament is pointless and unnecessary. The whole point is that Syria assumed Conference on Disarmament Presidency in strict accordance with the Rules of Procedures of the Conference on Disarmament, and as testified by many delegations its performance as the President was exemplarily professional.
2. One does not need to cut off their nose to spite their face. It would simply be consequential; that certain delegations did not like Syria to preside over the Conference on Disarmament, for any reason or excuse whatsoever, could not entitle them to berate the Conference on Disarmament or undercut its Rules of Procedure. There is nothing in the Conference on Disarmament's Rules of Procedures which could be interpreted or even misinterpreted to qualify or conditionalize a member State's right to preside over the Conference on Disarmament by rotation, **unless** certain parties are set to derail the Conference on Disarmament by engaging Member States in unnecessary argumentations in order to deviate and divert attention from the Conference on Disarmament's principal mandate, which is "disarmament".
3. The Note Verbale, circulated by the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on 7 September on behalf of a group of States is simply a disservice to the Conference on Disarmament and its core mandate, which is multilateral disarmament, by unnecessarily magnifying a non-issue that should have been resolved weeks ago; it simply ignores and undermines the Conference on Disarmament Rules of Procedure, in particular its paragraphs 3 and 9. Equally important it derides a long-established culture of professionalism and respect prevalent in this body by using derogatory language against a Member State.
4. Let's not mix things together; if a simple political claim against a State is to be used to strip it of its right under the Conference on Disarmament rules to preside, then by analogy those States that have indeed used weapons of mass destruction in cold blood or have knowingly provided chemical materials or arsenals to the warring parties, including to Saddam Hussein's regime during his bloody aggressive war against Iran, are fairly expected to forego their membership in the Conference on Disarmament altogether!
5. Suffice it to note that a number of States that co-sponsored Note Verbale dated 7 September did provide chemical materials, sometimes under the coverage of "pesticides", to Saddam's Iraq. Do such States enjoy

"legitimacy" to preside over the Conference on Disarmament for the coming months? That's a question we should perhaps wait to raise when the time comes.

I thank you Madam President

Conference on Disarmament

14 September 2018

English

Original: French

Note verbale dated 14 September 2018 sent to the Conference on Disarmament by the Permanent Mission of France, transmitting the statement of 21 August 2018 by the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and France, on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the chemical weapons attack in Ghouta

The Permanent Representation of France to the Conference on Disarmament presents its compliments to the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith the statement of 21 August 2018, by the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and France, on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the chemical weapons attack in Ghouta.

The Permanent Representation of France would be grateful if the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament would circulate this document to member States and observers in the Conference and issue it as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Permanent Representation of France to the Conference on Disarmament avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs the assurances of its highest consideration.

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Please recycle



Syria — Statement of the United States, the United Kingdom and France on the Fifth Anniversary of the Chemical Weapons Attack in Ghouta, Syria

21 August 2018

1. On the fifth anniversary of the horrific Ghouta sarin gas attack, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and France reiterate their condemnation of the use of chemical weapons by the Bashar Al-Assad regime. Since 2012, the Syrian regime has resorted to the use of chemical weapons during military offensives not only in Ghouta, but also in Khan Sheikhoun, Al Lataminah, Saraqib and Douma, killing and injuring thousands of people. As permanent members of the Security Council, we reaffirm our shared resolve to prevent the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime and to hold it accountable for any such use.

2. Our position on the Assad regime's use of chemical weapons is unchanged. As we have shown, we will respond appropriately to any further use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime, as these weapons have had such devastating humanitarian consequences for the Syrian people.

3. We welcome the establishment of assignment arrangements at the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), in accordance with its authority under the Chemical Weapons Convention, as confirmed by the decision of the Conference of the States Parties. These arrangements will help ensure that anyone who resorts to the use of chemical weapons in Syria can be identified. We welcome the launch of the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons on 23 January 2018, and we call on all countries that are committed to fight impunity to join it. We remain committed to securing justice for victims of the use of chemical weapons.

4. Furthermore, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and France are gravely concerned about reports of a military offensive by the Syrian regime against civilians and civilian infrastructure in Idlib and about the offensive's consequences in humanitarian terms. We also emphasize our concern about the potential for the further — illegal — use of chemical weapons.

5. We urge the supporters of the Assad regime to use their influence to ensure respect for the international standard against the use of chemical weapons. We call upon those countries to recognize that the uncontrolled use of chemical weapons by any State presents an unacceptable security threat to all States. We call upon the international community to support our collective efforts to end the use by Syria of chemical weapons. And we remain resolved to act if the Assad regime once again resorts to the use of chemical weapons.

Conference on Disarmament

14 September 2018

English

Original: French

Note verbale dated 14 September 2018 sent to the Conference on Disarmament by the permanent representation of France, containing the statement of 14 April 2018 by the President of the French Republic, Mr. Emmanuel Macron, on the intervention by the armed forces of France in response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria

The Permanent Representation of France to the Conference on Disarmament presents its compliments to the Office of Disarmament Affairs and has the honour to send it herewith the statement of 14 April 2018 by the President of the French Republic, Mr. Emmanuel Macron, on the intervention by the armed forces of France in response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria.

The Permanent Representation of France would be grateful if the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament would circulate this document to member States and observers in the Conference and issue it as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Permanent Representation of France to the Conference on Disarmament avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs the assurances of its highest consideration.

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**Statement by the President of the French Republic, Mr.
Emmanuel Macron, on the intervention by the armed forces
of France in response to the use of chemical weapons in
Syria, 14 April 2018**

1. On Saturday, 7 April 2018, dozens of men, women and children were massacred in Douma with the use of chemical weapons, in complete violation of international law and United Nations Security Council resolutions.
2. There is no doubt as to the facts and the responsibility of the Syrian regime.
3. The red line established by France in May 2017 has been crossed.
4. I therefore ordered the armed forces of France to intervene last night, as part of an international operation conducted in a coalition with the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, against the clandestine chemical weapons arsenal of the Syrian regime.
5. Our response has been limited to the Syrian regime's facilities for the production and use of chemical weapons.
6. We can have no tolerance for the normalization of the use of chemical weapons, which poses an immediate danger to the Syrian people and to our collective security. That is the essence of the initiatives constantly put forward by France at the United Nations Security Council.
7. France and its partners will today resume their efforts at the United Nations to set up an international mechanism to establish responsibility, prevent impunity and obstruct any temptation on the part of the Syrian regime to repeat these acts.
8. Since May 2017, France has consistently had the same priority objectives in Syria: to finish the fight against Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant; to allow civilians to have access to humanitarian assistance; to set in motion a collective momentum to come to a peaceful settlement of the conflict so that peace can finally return to Syria; and to ensure the stability of the region.
9. I shall pursue these objectives with determination in the coming days and weeks.
10. In accordance with article 35, paragraph 2, of the Constitution, the French parliament will be informed and a parliamentary debate will be held following this decision to order the intervention of our armed forces abroad.

Conference on Disarmament

14 September 2018

Original: English

Report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly of the United Nations

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GE.18-15458(E)



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I. Introduction

1. The Conference on Disarmament submits to the seventy-third session of the General Assembly of the United Nations its annual report on its 2018 session, together with the pertinent documents and records.

II. Organization of the work of the Conference

A. 2018 session of the Conference

2. The Conference was in session from 22 January to 30 March, 14 May to 29 June and 30 July to 14 September 2018. During this period, the Conference held 41 formal plenary meetings, at which member States as well as non-member States invited to participate in the discussions outlined their views and recommendations on the various issues before the Conference.
3. The Conference also held 15 informal plenary meetings.
4. The Presidency was assumed in accordance with rule 9 of the rules of procedure.
5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. António Guterres addressed the Conference on Disarmament on 26 February 2018 (CD/PV.1445).
6. Upon the joint invitation of the first President of the Conference, Mr. Ravinatha Aryasinha, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the Conference on Disarmament, and of the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Michael Möller, the following dignitaries addressed the Conference on Disarmament: Ms. Sigrid Kaag, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands (CD/PV.1445); Mr. Lassina Zerbo, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) (CD/PV.1445); Mr. Miroslav Lajčák, President of the of the UN General Assembly (CD/PV.1445); Mr. Ignazio Cassis, Head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland (CD/PV.1446); Mr. Miguel Ruiz-Cabanas, Deputy Minister of Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights of Mexico (CD/PV.1446); Mr. Kyaw Tin, Union Minister for International Cooperation of the Republic of Myanmar (CD/PV.1446); Mr. Fernando Simas Magalhães, Vice-Minister for Multilateral Political Affairs of Brazil (CD/PV.1446); Mr. Karl Erjavec, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Slovenia (CD/PV.1447); Mr. Alfonso María Dastis, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Spain (CD/PV.1447); Mr. Sidiki Kaba, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Senegal (CD/PV.1447); Ms. Kang Kyung-wha, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea (CD/PV.1447); Ms. Margot Wallström, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden (CD/PV.1447); Ms. Chrystia Freeland, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada (CD/PV.1447); Mr. Sameh Shoukry, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt (CD/PV.1447); Mr. Yerzhan Ashikbayev, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan (CD/PV.1448); Mr. Ivan Korčok, State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic (CD/PV.1448); Mr. Ciarán Cannon, T.D., Minister of State at the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Ireland (CD/PV.1448); Mr. Manabu Horii, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan (CD/PV.1448); Mr. Jorge Arreaza Montessat, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Venezuela (CD/PV.1448); Mr. Ahmet Yıldız, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey (CD/PV.1449); Mr. Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (CD/PV.1449); Mr. Golam Hossein Dehghani, Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs of Iran (CD/PV.1449); Mr. George Ciamba, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania (CD/PV.1449); Mr. Luwellyn Tyrone Landers, Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of South Africa (CD/PV.1449). Upon the invitation of the fifth President of the Conference, Mr. Walid Doudech, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Tunisia, Ms. Karin Kneissl, Minister for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs of Austria (CD/PV.1463) and Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and

Compliance of the United States, Dr. Yleem D.S. Poblete (CD/PV.1465) addressed the Conference on Disarmament.

7. The substantive secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament was composed as follows: Mr. Michael Møller, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations; Ms. Anja Kaspersen, Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Director of the Geneva Branch, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs; Ms. Silvia Mercogliano, Senior Political Affairs Officer and Secretary of the Conference on Disarmament (until 31 March 2018) and Mr. Marco Kalbusch, Senior Political Affairs Officer and Secretary of the Conference on Disarmament (as of 1 April 2018).

B. Participants in the work of the Conference

8. The representatives of the following 65 member States participated in the work of the Conference: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam and Zimbabwe.

C. Attendance and participation of States not members of the Conference

9. In accordance with the rules of procedure and the decision taken at its 1990 session on its improved and effective functioning (CD/1036), the Conference received and considered requests for participation in its work from 45 States not members of the Conference. Accordingly, the Conference invited the following non-member States to participate in its work: Albania, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Honduras, Jordan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, Nicaragua, Oman, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovenia, Togo, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, United Arab Emirates and Uruguay.

D. Agenda and programme of work for the 2018 session

10. At its 1434th plenary meeting on 23 January 2018, following a debate in which the content of the draft agenda presented by the President of the Conference, Mr. Ravinatha Pandukabhaya Ariyasingha, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka was reviewed in accordance with rule 29 of the rules of procedure, the Conference on Disarmament adopted its agenda for the 2018 session (CD/PV.1434). The agenda (CD/2116) read as follows:

"Taking into account, inter alia, the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and deciding to resume its consultations on the review of its agenda, and without prejudice to their outcome, the Conference adopts the following agenda for its 2018 session:

1. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
2. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.
3. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.

4. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
5. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.
6. Comprehensive programme of disarmament.
7. Transparency in armaments.
8. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly of the United Nations."

11. Subsequently, the President made the following statement: "In connection with the adoption of the agenda, I, as the President of the Conference, should like to state that it is my understanding that if there is a consensus in the Conference to deal with any issues, they could be dealt with within this agenda. The Conference will also take into consideration rules 27 and 30 of the rules of procedure of the Conference."

12. Pursuant to paragraph 56 of the 2017 report of the Conference (CD/2112), the last President of the 2017 session (Spain) and the first President of the 2018 session (Sri Lanka), conducted informal consultations during the intersessional period with a view to commencing early substantive work during the 2018 session of the Conference.

13. At the 1442nd plenary meeting on 16 February 2018, the Conference adopted decision CD/2119, submitted by the President of the Conference, Mr. Ravinatha Pandukabhaya Ariyasinha, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka, which reads as follows:

"The Conference on Disarmament,

Cognizant of its role as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum established by the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-I),

Noting that it provides its Member States with a platform to engage in negotiations, on the basis of the rule of consensus,

Convinced that disarmament and arms limitations, particularly in the nuclear field, contributes to the prevention of the danger of nuclear war and strengthening of international peace and security,

Taking into account developments in the field of international peace and security of concern to the Conference,

In pursuance of its agenda contained in CD/2116,

Noting that the agenda continues to provide the opportunity to address contemporary disarmament and international security challenges,

Recalling paragraph 28 of its rules of procedure which calls on the Conference to establish its programme of work on the basis of its agenda,

Taking into account the several proposals tabled since 2000 for the programme of work of the Conference and the interest to see the Conference return to substantive work,

Conscious of the need to conduct its work in a balanced and comprehensive manner,

Without prejudice to the right of any member State of the Conference to raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference at a plenary and to further decisions that may be taken on substantive work,

And without prejudice to the rules of procedure of the Conference and the responsibilities entrusted to the President under the rules of procedure of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular rule 29 for drawing up the programme of work of the Conference,

Cognizant of the complex nature of the issues under its purview and the wide range of perspectives thereon,

Seeking to advance the substantive work of the Conference in fulfilment of its mandate in accordance with SSOD I,

Decides:

1. To establish, in accordance with Paragraph 23 of its rules of procedure, subsidiary bodies on agenda items 1 (one) to 4 (four), and one on agenda items 5 (five), 6 (six) and 7 (seven), which could also consider emerging and other issues relevant to substantive work of the Conference. In their work the subsidiary bodies would pursue the following areas and any other areas agreed by the subsidiary bodies, in accordance with the rules of procedure:

(a) To reach an understanding on the areas of commonalities in the Conference on Disarmament by taking into consideration all relevant views and proposals past, present and future;

(b) Deepening technical discussions and broadening areas of agreement, including through the participation, in accordance with the rules of procedure, of relevant experts;

(c) Consider effective measures, including legal instruments for negotiations;

2. Each subsidiary body will be chaired by a coordinator appointed by the Conference, under the guidance of the President on the basis of equitable regional distribution;

3. The subsidiary bodies shall meet in accordance with paragraph 24 of the rules of procedure, and shall conduct their work in accordance with paragraph 18 of the rules of procedure, with even allocation of time;

4. In accordance with rule 35 of the rules of procedure, the subsidiary bodies shall remain open to all Member States of the Conference on Disarmament and to those non Member States that the Conference has invited to participate in its work during the 2018 session;

5. The report on the progress achieved and agreed on in each subsidiary body would be submitted by its coordinator to the Conference on Disarmament, through the President, for adoption and due reflection in the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly of the United Nations;

6. This decision is taken for the 2018 session, without prejudice to any subsequent decision at the beginning of the next annual sessions of the Conference on Disarmament."

14. At the 1455th plenary meeting on 27 March 2018 the Conference adopted decision CD/2126, submitted by the President of the Conference, Ms. Sabrina Dallafior, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the Conference on Disarmament, on the appointment of the coordinators of the subsidiary bodies and the timetable of the meetings of the subsidiary bodies, which reads as follows:

"The Conference on Disarmament,

In accordance with Paragraph 23 of its rules of procedure and in pursuance of its decision CD/2119 to establish subsidiary bodies,

Decides:

1. On the basis of equitable geographic distribution, to appoint the following coordinators of the subsidiary bodies:

- Subsidiary body 1: Cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament
H.E. Mr Hasan Kleib, Ambassador of Indonesia;

- Subsidiary body 2: Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters
H.E. Mr Robbert Jan Gabriëse, Ambassador of the Netherlands;
- Subsidiary body 3: Prevention of an arms race in outer space
H.E. Mr Guilherme de Aguiar Patriota, Ambassador of Brazil;
- Subsidiary body 4: Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
H.E. Mr Michael Biontino, Ambassador of Germany;
- Subsidiary body 5: New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons — Comprehensive programme of disarmament — Transparency in armament — Emerging and other issues relevant to the substantive work of the Conference could also be considered, in accordance with CD/2119
H.E. Mr Yuri Ambrazevich, Ambassador of Belarus;

2. That the subsidiary bodies will meet in accordance with the timetable annexed to this decision."

E. Expansion of the membership of the Conference

15. The question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference was addressed by delegations in plenary meetings. Their views on the issue are duly reflected in the plenary records.

16. Since 1982, requests for membership have been received from the following 27 non-members, in chronological order: Greece, Croatia, Kuwait, Portugal, Slovenia, Czechia, Costa Rica, Denmark, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Cyprus, Lithuania, Ghana, Luxembourg, Uruguay, Philippines, Azerbaijan, Libya, Armenia, Thailand, Georgia, Jordan, Estonia, Latvia, Malta, Serbia, Republic of Moldova and Qatar.

F. Review of the agenda of the Conference

17. The review of the agenda of the Conference was addressed by delegations in plenary meetings. Their views on the issue are duly reflected in the plenary records.

G. Improved and effective functioning of the Conference

18. The improved and effective functioning of the Conference was addressed by delegations in plenary meetings. Their views on the issue are duly reflected in the plenary records.

H. Communications from non-governmental organizations

19. During the general debate, delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on the Conference's interaction with civil society. Their views are duly reflected in the plenary records of the Conference.

III. Substantive work of the Conference during its 2018 session

20. During the general debate of the Conference, delegations affirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on the agenda items. These positions are duly recorded in the plenary records of the session.

21. The lists of documents issued by the Conference, as well as the texts of these documents, are included as Appendix I to this report. An index of the verbatim records by country and by subject, listing the statements made by delegations during 2018 and the verbatim records of the formal plenary meetings of the Conference, is attached as Appendix II to this report.

22. The Conference had before it a letter dated 2 January 2018 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitting the resolutions and decisions on disarmament and international security matters adopted by the General Assembly at its seventy-second session in 2017, including those making specific reference to the Conference on Disarmament (CD/2115).

A. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament

23. During the general debate of the Conference, delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on this agenda item. These positions are duly recorded in the plenary records of the session.

24. As per the decision adopted by the Conference (CD/2126), subsidiary body 1, Cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament, coordinated by H.E. Mr Hasan Kujib, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Indonesia, met on 25 June (afternoon); 26 June (afternoon); 31 July (afternoon); 2 August (morning and afternoon); 3 August (morning) and 9 August (afternoon).

B. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters

25. During the general debate of the Conference, delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on this agenda item. These positions are duly recorded in the plenary records of the session.

26. As per the decision adopted by the Conference (CD/2126), subsidiary body 2, Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, coordinated by H.E. Mr Robert Jan Gabriëls, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Netherlands, met on 15 May (afternoon); 16 May (afternoon); 27 June (afternoon); 28 June (morning and afternoon); 29 June (morning) and 7 August (afternoon).

C. Prevention of an arms race in outer space

27. During the general debate of the Conference, delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on this agenda item. These positions are duly recorded in the plenary records of the session.

28. As per the decision adopted by the Conference (CD/2126), subsidiary body 3, Prevention of an arms race in outer space, coordinated by H.E. Mr Guilherme de Aquino Patriota, Ambassador and Special Representative of Brazil, met on 23 May (afternoon); 23 May (morning); 5 June (afternoon); 6 June (afternoon); 7 June (morning and afternoon); and 24 August (morning).

D. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

29. During the general debate of the Conference, delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on this agenda item. These positions are duly recorded in the plenary records of the session.

30. As per the decision adopted by the Conference (CD/2126), subsidiary body 4, Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, coordinated by H.E. Mr Michael Biontino, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Germany, met on 22 May (afternoon); 24 May (morning);

11 June (afternoon); 12 June (afternoon); 13 June (afternoon); 14 June (afternoon) and 22 August (afternoon).

E. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons

31. During the general debate of the Conference, delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on this agenda item. These positions are duly recorded in the plenary records of the session.

32. As per the decision adopted by the Conference (CD/2126), subsidiary body 5, New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons — Comprehensive programme of disarmament Transparency in armament — Emerging and other issues relevant to the substantive work of the Conference could also be considered, in accordance with CD/2119, coordinated by H.E. Mr Yury Ambrazevich, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Belarus, met on 17 May (afternoon); 18 May (morning); 19 June (afternoon); 20 June (afternoon); 21 June (morning and afternoon); and 23 August (afternoon).

F. Comprehensive programme of disarmament

33. During the general debate of the Conference, delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on this agenda item. These positions are duly recorded in the plenary records of the session.

34. As per the decision adopted by the Conference (CD/2126), subsidiary body 5, New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons — Comprehensive programme of disarmament — Transparency in armament — Emerging and other issues relevant to the substantive work of the Conference could also be considered, in accordance with CD/2119, coordinated by H.E. Mr Yury Ambrazevich, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Belarus, met on 17 May (afternoon); 18 May (morning); 19 June (afternoon); 20 June (afternoon); 21 June (morning and afternoon); and 23 August (afternoon).

G. Transparency in armaments

35. During the general debate of the Conference, delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on this agenda item. These positions are duly recorded in the plenary records of the session.

36. As per the decision adopted by the Conference (CD/2126), subsidiary body 5, New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons — Comprehensive programme of disarmament — Transparency in armament — Emerging and other issues relevant to the substantive work of the Conference could also be considered, in accordance with CD/2119, coordinated by H.E. Mr Yury Ambrazevich, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Belarus, met on 17 May (afternoon); 18 May (morning); 19 June (afternoon); 20 June (afternoon); 21 June (morning and afternoon); and 23 August (afternoon).

H. Consideration and adoption of the annual report of the Conference and any other report as appropriate to the General Assembly of the United Nations

37. The Conference decided that the dates for its 2019 session would be:

First part: 21 January – 29 March

38. The annual report to the seventy-third session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, as adopted by the Conference on 14 September 2018, is transmitted by the President on behalf of the Conference on Disarmament.

Ms. Beliz Celasin Rende, *Chargée d'Affaires ad interim*
Turkey
President of the Conference

Conference on Disarmament

24 December 2018

English

Original: Spanish

Note verbale dated 25 September 2018 from the Permanent Mission of Mexico, in its capacity as coordinator of the work of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), addressed to the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and transmitting the "Declaration of the Member States of OPANAL on the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons" (document Inf. 15/2018Rev.6)

The Permanent Mission of Mexico to the United Nations Office and other international organizations in Geneva, in its capacity as coordinator of the work of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) in Geneva, presents its compliments to the Office for Disarmament Affairs, secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament, and has the pleasure to refer to the forthcoming 2019 session of the Conference.

In this connection, the Permanent Mission of Mexico, in its capacity as coordinator of OPANAL, transmits herewith the English- and Spanish-language versions of the "Declaration of the Member States of OPANAL on the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons" (document Inf. 15/2018Rev.6), and requests that this document be circulated and registered as an official document of the 2019 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Permanent Mission of Mexico to the United Nations Office and other international organizations based in Geneva takes this opportunity to convey to the Office for Disarmament Affairs, secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament, the renewed assurances of its highest consideration.



Annex

Declaration of the Member States of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (26 September 2018)

The member States of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL),

Conscious of their historic commitment to nuclear disarmament,

Reaffirming that a world without nuclear weapons is essential for the accomplishment of the priority objectives of humanity, those being peace, security, development, and the protection of the natural environment,

Recognizing that to achieve and maintain a world free from nuclear weapons is a responsibility shared by all Member States of the United Nations,

Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,

Reaffirming that the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons are a violation of the Charter of the United Nations, a violation of International Law, including International Humanitarian Law, and constitute a crime against humanity,

Proud to belong to Latin America and the Caribbean, the first densely populated region in the world that, by means of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), established a nuclear-weapon-free zone on 14 February 1967,

Recalling that the Treaty of Tlatelolco has been rigorously complied with by its States Party for more than 50 years, relying on the permanent work of OPANAL, the only international intergovernmental organization specializing in non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons,

Reiterating the full validity of the declarations on nuclear disarmament adopted by the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) on 20 August 2013, in Buenos Aires; on 29 January 2014, in Havana; on 29 January 2015, in Belén; on 27 January 2016, in Quito; and on 25 January 2017, in Punta Cana.

Conscious that the Treaty of Tlatelolco and OPANAL are political, judicial and institutional references for the creation of other nuclear-weapon-free zones,

Reiterating also their conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is closely related to the maintenance of international peace and security and that the prohibition of nuclear weapons in different regions, adopted by sovereign decision of the States comprised therein, has a beneficial influence over other regions,

Emphasizing their rejection of nuclear weapons, which, after more than 70 years of existence and use, continue to pose a risk to international peace and security and ultimately may even render the whole earth uninhabitable,

Highlighting the importance of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 4 December 2017: 72/30, "Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons", and 72/37, "Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world", which represent important political advances towards the delegitimization of nuclear weapons,

Fully aware of the obligation set forth in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the unequivocal commitment of nuclear-weapon States to negotiate effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that the prohibition of nuclear weapons is a means to contribute to the elimination of nuclear weapons in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner within clearly established time frames and that elimination is the only truly effective guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

The Member States of OPANAL,

Join in the commemoration, on 26 September 2018, of the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, established by resolution 68/32 (2013) of the United Nations General Assembly;

On this occasion, the Member States:

1. *Call attention to the adoption and recall the opening for signature of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons that prohibits the possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;*
2. *Consider that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, as well as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the soon entry into force of both instruments will join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on the road towards the elimination of those weapons of mass destruction in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner within clearly established time frames;*
3. *Reiterate their concern over the existence of about 15 thousand nuclear weapons that pose an unacceptable threat to humankind, a danger that becomes more serious by the day;*
4. *Recall that this concern is reflected in numerous resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, including Res. 1 (I) of 24 January 1946, as well as in the preamble of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean of 1967, and in the preamble of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968, and in the preamble of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons;*
5. *Also recall that the First Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament (SSOD I), in 1978, affirmed in its Final Document¹ that "nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization", and such situation has not changed;*
6. *Reiterate the commitment of the States of the region endorsed in the Proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace to continue to promote nuclear disarmament as a priority objective and to contribute to general and complete disarmament in order to favour the strengthening of trust between nations;*
7. *Firmly demand that nuclear weapons not be used again, under any circumstances by any actor, which can only be assured by the prohibition and the subsequent transparent, verifiable and irreversible elimination of all nuclear weapons;*
8. *Reiterate the call upon all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their security and defence doctrines and policies and to comply fully with their legal obligations and unequivocal commitments to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons without further delay;*
9. *Firmly demand that nuclear-weapon States cease the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of these weapons, and cease to propose new scenarios and procedures for the development and employment of these arms,*

which is inconsistent with the obligation to adopt effective measures towards nuclear disarmament;

10. *Call upon* all States to refrain from carrying out nuclear weapon test explosions, or any other non-explosive experiment, including subcritical experiments for the improvement of nuclear weapons; such actions are contrary to the spirit and purposes of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), thus undermining its desired impact as a nuclear disarmament measure;

11. *Urge* the States included in Annex 2 to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)² that have not ratified the Treaty to take the necessary measures to do so as soon as possible;

12. *Reiterate* that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, is vital to the achievement of nuclear disarmament and to international security; and in this regard, *call upon* all States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States, without further delay and without conditions;

13. *Express* their determination to work for the success of the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);

14. *Recognize* the essential role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and of the safeguards agreements in the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

15. *Confirm* the inalienable right of all States to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination;

16. *Urge* nuclear-weapon States that made interpretative declarations concerning Additional Protocols I and II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco that are contrary to the spirit of the Treaty to review the propositions made by OPANAL with the aim of resolving this problem in order to give full and unequivocal security assurances to the States that comprise the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as to respect the militarily denuclearized character of the zone of application of the Treaty of Tlatelolco;

17. *Underline* the importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones as an instrument for nuclear disarmament and, in this regard, *encourage* the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones by means of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the regions concerned;

18. *Regret* the more than two-decade failure to comply with the resolution on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East,³ an integral part of the commitments of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and of the Final Documents of the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

19. *Reiterate* their commitment to continue to promote the dialogue and cooperation among Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, including Mongolia, through, *inter alia*, the convening, in 2020, of a fourth Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia;

20. *Reiterate further* their conviction that the dissemination of information concerning the danger posed by nuclear weapons is essential so that society as a whole may join the efforts for the elimination of nuclear weapons;

21. *Undertake* to continue to work for the implementation of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation education programmes, convinced that they are an effective means to contribute to the consolidation of international peace and security.

² The People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the United States of America, the Republic of India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the State of Israel, and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

³ NPT CONF 1995 17 (Part II) annex.